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The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-
2000:  What Does It Mean to Move
Beyond “Black and White” Politics?
LatCrit 2002 took place at an auspicious political juncture, ayear and a half after the fateful Bush v. Gore  decision,1
which broke a virtual electoral tie in favor of the Republican
presidential candidate, and six months prior to the 2002 Novem-
ber midterm elections, in which Republicans swept into power in
both houses of Congress, breaking historical trends.  LatCritVII
was the first time that a LatCrit conference project convened a
panel that focused on voting issues, Focusing the Electoral Lens:
Capturing Post-2000 Latina/o and APA Political Strength in the
Redistricting Process .2  Chaired by Professor Keith Aoki, this
concurrent panel focused on three themes. First, Professor Keith
Aoki and Kathay Feng discussed the importance to Asian Pacific
Islander Americans (APIAs) and Latinas/os of the redistricting
battles unleashed in California as a consequence of the 2000 Cen-
sus.  Their contribution is memorialized in the first article of this
cluster, Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redis-
tricting in California ,3 summarizing the law of redistricting as it
affects minority representation, and describing the strategy that
APIA and Latina/o civil rights groups used in the 2000 redistrict-
ing battles in California.  Associate Dean Kevin Johnson’s pres-
entation focused on the growing cleavages within the Latina/o
community around representation issues.  His contribution is me-
morialized in the second article of this cluster, Latinas/os and the
Political Process: The Need for Critical Inquiry ,4 in which he
thoughtfully presents a list of research issues on voting, redistrict-
ing, and representational theory.  Finally, this author presented
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 See  LatCrit VII Program Schedule, Saturday, May 4, 2002, Portland, Oregon,
Concurrent Panel, Focusing the Electoral Lens:  Capturing Post-2000 Latina/o and
APA Political Strength in the Redistricting Process , available at  http://per-
sonal.law.miami.edu/~fvaldes/latcrit/lcviidocs/lcviiinvitation.htm [hereinafter Lat-
Crit VII] (last visited July 10, 2003).
3 Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki & Bryan Ikegami, Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os
and Post-2000 Redistricting in California , 81 OR. L. REV. 849 (2002).
4 Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and the Political Process:  The Need for Critical
Inquiry , 81 OR. L. REV. 917 (2002).
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Initiatives and Minority Rights .5  When minorities’ civil rights are
put to a vote in initiatives and referendums, minorities lose over
eighty percent of the time.6  As I explain in Part IV below, devis-
ing civil rights litigation strategies and applying LatCrit race anal-
ysis can counter errant majoritarian animus.
Voting matters very much.  As Kevin Johnson remarks, the po-
litical process and electoral representation are now at the center
of addressing Latina/o civil rights issues.7  Kathay Feng, Keith
Aoki, and Bryan Ikegami emphasize the importance of focusing
on voting and the electoral process as part of the LatCrit schol-
arly and activist project stating that “meaningful political partici-
pation beginning (but not ending) with fair representation is an
absolutely necessary and crucial precondition to achieving and
implementing the substantive social justice and anti-subordina-
tion agenda of LatCrit.”8  Aoki, Feng, Ikegami and Johnson
make the straightforward point that the post-Civil Rights move-
ment cannot be sustained by the courts;9 but rather, civil rights
advances must come from legislatures and local governments.
The Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s came from
the federal bench, led by the Warren Court, and revolutionized
race relations in the United States with cases like Brown v. Board
of Education10 and Loving v. Virginia .11  Research has now
shown that in the 1980s President Reagan and the Republicans
deliberately set about to undermine the federal bench’s support
of civil rights, and systematically went about ensuring that judi-
cial appointments would reverse civil rights gains.12  The Bush
plan, after the Republican Congressional midterm electoral
sweep, is to put in place conservative Article III judges as quickly
5 My remarks were based on Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives
and Referendums in which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship , 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 462-73 (1999) [hereinafter Initiatives & Minorities].
6 Id . at Appendix A.
7 Johnson, supra  note 4.
8 See Feng, Aoki, & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 855.
9 This point is not new, see , e.g. , GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT:  THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
(1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court has been largely antagonistic to racial mi-
nority anti-subordination goals).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12 Dawn Johnsen, Tipping the Scale:  President Bush picks judges based on ideol-
ogy—so why shouldn’t senators reject them for it? , WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2002,
at 15.
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as possible.13  The impending swift senatorial approval will solid-
ify an already conservative federal bench.14  According to an em-
pirical study on judicial decision making, party affiliation is the
most salient factor, even more so than gender or race, in predict-
ing what kinds of rulings a judge will make.15  Such research sug-
gests that judges’ decisions hinge more on their political
attitudes, rather than the “plain meaning” of constitutional or
statutory text.16  The only way to counter impending restrictive
interpretive decisions is through legislative action; in effect, to
provide the opportunity for Congress and state legislatures to
veto court decisions by rewriting statutes, as Kevin Johnson
notes.17
Voting issues are also about pragmatic politics.  As Feng, Aoki,
and Ikegami point out, “Only when minorities are represented in
local government—school boards, zoning boards, city councils—
do the every day needs of minority communities become part of
the local agenda.”18  The key to advancing a political anti-subor-
dination agenda is how well Latinas/os and APIAs can make an
impact at the ballot box.
My aim in this Article is to frame the challenges to LatCrit
theory and activism posed by voting rights, electoral process, and
minority politics.19  In order to focus on the key challenges, I
13 Warren Richey, After GOP Senate Sweep, Judiciary Is Set to Shift Right; Dozens
of judicial nominees will likely get quick approval in 108th Congress , CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2002, at 4.
14 See also JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  Susan B. Haire, Martha Anne Humphries &
Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of Clinton’s Courts of Appeals Appointees ,
84 JUDICATURE 274 (2001) (finding that Clinton appointments were “moderate”
putting George W. Bush in a strong position to significantly add to conservative
federal judges selected during the Reagan-Bush era).
15 Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind:  An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,  73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1388 (1998).
16 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra  note 14, at 32-73.
17 See  Johnson, supra  note 4, at 919.  However, as Johnson indicates in his own
prior work, it is the rare case where Congress actually vetoes the Supreme Court’s
handiwork, particularly in the area of immigration law. See  Kevin R. Johnson, Los
Olvidados:  Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigra-
tion Law and Enforcement , 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1993) [hereinafter Johnson,
Political Power of Noncitizens].
18 Feng et al., supra  note 3.
19 LatCrit theorists and minority scholars have already assembled an impressive
scholarship on voting rights and electoral law. See , e.g. , LANI GUINIER, THE TYR-
ANNY OF THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOC-
RACY [hereinafter GUINIER, TYRANNY]; LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE
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pose this question:  What does a LatCrit theorist mean when she
proposes to move beyond the “Black-White” paradigm?20  Part I
discusses the changes in the U.S. electorate that in post-2000
have made the Latina/o and APIA vote the darling of both major
parties.  In the process of being perceived as an important electo-
ral group, Latinas/os and APIAs are at times being depicted as
“model minorities.”  Part I concludes that going beyond the
MINER’S CANARY (2002); Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy:  The Voting Rights
Cases , 108 HARV. L. REV. 109 (1994); Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics , 79
N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2001) [hereinafter Smith, Race and Money in Politics]; Terry
Smith, A Black Party?  Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party
Paradigm , 48 DUKE L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Smith, A Black Party]; Spencer Over-
ton, But Some Are More Equal:  Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance , 80 TEX. L.
REV. 987, 1024-25 (2002) [hereinafter Overton, But Some Are More Equal]; Spencer
Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race , 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 469 (2001); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., ColorBlindness, Race Neutrality, and
Voting Rights , 51 EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave District-
ing , 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135 (1999); Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion
Leads to Exclusion:  The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in Eco-
nomic Development , 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (2001); Keith Aoki, A Tale of Three
Cities:  Thoughts on Asian American Electoral and Political Power After 2000 , 8
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2002); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court:
Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation” and an Exegisis into the Judicial Role , 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 (2003); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal
Protection and the Modern Redistricting Revolution:  A Plea for Rationality , 80 N.C.
L. REV. 1383 (2002); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to
Racial Redistricting in the New Millenium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study , 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227 (2001); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism
and Democratic Politics:  Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:
Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation , 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997); Je-
rome M. Culp, Edited Comments on Political Participation , 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
399 (1995).
20 This is one of the central themes of LatCrit theory. See  Devon W. Carbado,
Race to the Bottom , 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1305-12 (2002); Dorothy E. Roberts,
BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism , 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1999);
Berta Esperanza Herna´ndez-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit Pos-
sibilities:  Culture, Gender, and Sex , 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811 (1999); Juan F. Perea,
The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The “Normal Science” of American Ra-
cial Thought , 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127 (1998); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth
Chronicle:  Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary ,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997).  APIA crits have also made significant contributions to
rethinking the Black-White paradigm. See  Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian
American Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race Theory, Post Structuralism, and Narrative
Space , 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993); Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construc-
tion:  Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American Identity and Reflections on
the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm , 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 69
(1997); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White:  Asian Americans and Affirmative
Action  15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 248 (1995). See also  sources cited infra
n.135.
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Black-White paradigm in this context is to deconstruct the model
minority rhetoric, as APIA scholars have done in the affirmative
action debate.  In Part II, I discuss an important political issue to
Latinas/os and APIAs that intersects with civil rights and anti-
subordination analysis, the de jure  denial of the voting franchise
to more than ten million Latinas/os and APIAs because they are
noncitizens or are citizens for the sole reason that they reside in
Puerto Rico.  Part II concludes that thinking beyond the Black-
White paradigm in this context requires that LatCrit theorists
continue to address this exclusion as both a civil rights and race
issue.  In Part III, I review the electoral successes of 2002.  Even
with Latina/o and APIAs’ new found electoral influence, their
gains in electing representatives to Congress were slim, particu-
larly when compared to their strong population growth of over
fifty percent from 1990 to 2000.  There are four structural reasons
that account for continued lack of influence in congressional rep-
resentation:  representational politics, the politics of redistricting,
campaigning in racially polarized environments, and minority
voter turnout.  Finally, Part IV reviews direct democracy ballot
where electors in states voted on English-only initiatives, and ex-
plains why the direct democracy ballot continues to be a
bellweather for racial conflict that requires attuned judicial
scrutiny.
I
ELECTORAL POLITICS:  “NOT JUST BLACK AND
WHITE ANYMORE”
The Black-White paradigm is no longer statistically accurate.
The results of the 2000 Census revealed that Latinas/os now nu-
merically surpass African Americans and Asian Americans.21
APIAs and Latinas/os are the fastest  growing racial minority
groups in the country.22  This demographic shift in no way dimin-
21 The number of Latinas/os per the 2000 Census is 35.3 million, or thirteen per-
cent of the total population of 281.4 million people.  The number of African Ameri-
cans or Blacks is 34.7 million.  Bureau of Census, Census 2000 Brief:  Overview of
Race and Hispanic Origin , T.1  (Mar. 2001) available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf [hereinafter Census Hispanic Overview].  Among Blacks
and African Americans are 710,353 persons who identify as being of Latina/o or
Hispanic ethnic origin. Id.  at T.10.
22 Asian growth jumped from 6,908,639 in 1990 to 10,252,906 in 2000, or 48%. See
Bureau of Census, Census:  The Asian Population:  2000 Census Brief , available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-16.pdf (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Asian
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ishes the importance of race in electoral politics.  The only
change that has emerged is that the experts who carefully count
votes and monitor potential voters now talk about racial politics
in ways that include Latinas/os, APIAs, and Native Americans.
Part A discusses why the Latina/o and APIA vote has emerged
as important to national electoral strategies.  This may translate
into some influence at a national level.  The potential influence
of an emerging electorate causes politicians from both parties to
covet the marginal votes that might make the difference.  As Part
B discusses, meaningful minority representation continues to be
checked by white voters’ racial consciousness.  As recent elec-
tions show, white voters continue to reject minority candidates
when their racial consciousness has been aroused.
A. The Shift from the Black-White Paradigm
in Electoral Politics
As a result of major structural changes in United States electo-
ral politics, electoral contests have become very close.  The 2000
and 2002 contests were so close that in a parliamentary system
the results would have been ties.  In 2000, Bush’s presidency was
decided by 537 votes cast in Florida.23  In 2002, the Senate was
decided by fewer than 70,000 votes cast in Minnesota and Mis-
souri.24  This is under one-tenth of one percent of the entire vot-
ing electorate.
The controversy over the Bush vote in Florida can be under-
stood in terms of a crisis in legitimacy.25  It is also the conse-
Population].  The Latina/o population increased from 22,354,059 to 35,208,818, or
58%. Census Hispanic Overview , supra  note 21, at T.4.
23 The official state certified results were Bush 2,912,790 and Gore 2,912,253, a
difference of 537 votes.  Doyle McManus, Bob Drogin & Richard O’Reilly, Election
2000:  A Recount:  Bush Still Had Votes to Win in a Recount, Study Finds , L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A1.
24 In Missouri, just over 20,000 votes constituted the margin by which Democratic
Senator Jean Carnahan lost her seat to the Republican challenger, Jim Talent.  Ke-
vin Murphy, Talent Expects to Begin Some Senate Duties Next Week , KAN. CITY
STAR, Nov. 22, 2002, at B3.  The Democratic incumbent in Minnesota, Senator Well-
stone, was ahead in the polls when he, his wife, and daughter tragically died.  His
eleventh hour replacement, Fritz Mondale, lost by fewer than 50,000 votes. Some
Counties Fail to Report Wellstone Votes , Associated Press (St. Paul), available at
http://www.wcco.com/campaign2002/local_story_324101428.html.
25 See generally THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sun-
stein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). See Peter Gabel, What It Really Means to
Say “Law Is Politics”:  Political History and Legal Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2002) (arguing that all Americans “need to understand
exactly how we allowed ourselves to be disempowered”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 8  7-OCT-03 8:40
790 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81, 2002]
quence of winning advantages being so miniscule that they fall
within margins of statistical error.  When errors can decide a win-
ner, it becomes clear that the victory claimed by either side is
accidental.  What is called into question is whether the result is
the evinced will of the people, or just a manipulation of the vote
counting apparatus.
Fundamental structural reasons explain the shift in national
electoral politics to a game of such close margins.26  Under the
U.S. two-party system, the parties’ stands on political issues has
increasingly converged towards the middle.  The choices are lim-
ited; the two parties’ policy initiatives are difficult to distin-
guish.27 Each party’s base cannot go elsewhere to find a party
that would accommodate its ideology or political agenda.  With
the base captive, party leaders and strategists concentrate on
pitching their appeals to the marginal voter.28  This strategy tends
to obfuscate even more the differences between the parties.
Campaign finance has also played a role in this convergence.
Each party’s nominee must be a candidate who can raise hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in contributions because campaign
26 See  Bruce Cain, The Contemporary Context of Racial and Ethnic Politics in
California , in RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA (Byran O. Jackson &
Michael B. Preston eds., 1991); Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the
Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub:  Latino Electoral Participation after
Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage , 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 1513-14
(1993).  De la Garza and DeSipio identified seven structural changes:
1. The decline of political parties. . . .
2. The decline of partisan competition in many races. . . .
3. The rise of candidate-centered campaigns run by consultants indepen-
dent of the parties.
4. The increase in VRA-produced, safe, uncompetitive, ethnically homo-
geneous districts.
5. The increasing reliance on campaign technology that allows candidates
to target their message so that it reaches only those registered voters most
likely to vote and reduces outreach to communities that have not voted at
high rates in the past.
6. The use of direct-democracy ballot strategies such as initiatives, refer-
enda. . . .
7. The increasing diversification of the electorate, accompanied by ex-
tended ethnic-specific voting protections, including bilingual electoral in-
formation and districting guarantees to traditionally excluded groups such
as Asians, Native Americans, and Latinos.
Id .
27 See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?  THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFOR-
MATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995).
28 Professor Terry Smith reports that eighty to ninety percent of campaign funds
are invested in the ephemeral marginal votes.  Smith, Race and Money in Politics ,
supra  note 19, at 1488.
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monies are the key to election victories.  A 1998 study by the
Center for Responsive Politics concluded that nine out of ten
candidates who outspent their opponents won the election.29  In-
cumbents do well in elections because they are able to raise more
money than their opponents.  According to one study, 240 of the
349 congressional incumbents won their respective elections be-
cause their challengers spent less than one-half as much money.30
One implication of the importance of money in elections is that
candidates must adopt positions aligned with the interests of po-
tential donors.  Such alignment will mute the differences between
the parties.  To be sure, the major donors for each major party
are at odds on certain issues.  For example, trial lawyers (usually
Democratic donors) are at odds with large corporations and
HMOs (usually Republican donors) on tort reform and plaintiffs’
remedies for negligent actions; and unions (usually Democratic
donors) are at odds with large corporations and business groups
(usually Republican donors) over the right of labor to organize,
and the composition of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).  These are true disagreements.  However, campaign fi-
nance cuts down the range  of disagreements and keeps unchal-
lenged the major wealth creation and income distribution
structures in our society.  Social justice issues are never discussed
because no politician finds it to her advantage to bring up such
“hot topics” in her bid to be elected.  Moreover, the pool of po-
tential candidates is narrowed to those who can appeal to poten-
tial donors.  Since most of the country’s wealth is held by Whites,
minority candidates are winnowed out.31
Redistricting for the protection of incumbents is another cul-
29 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 50 (1997) (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
30 Id . (reporting on Common Cause study).
31 See  Overton, But Some Are More Equal , supra  note 19, at 1024-25 (stating that
because of the financial dominance of the White donors, their contribu-
tions will form a large majority of the money received by the Brown incum-
bents, despite the fact that most contributions from Whites continue to go
to Whites.  Brown incumbents from Brown districts will face insignificant
challenges from underfunded insurgents—who will usually be Browns. . . .
Because of this trend, little democratic dialogue about policy will take
place in Brown communities.);
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary , 11 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 273, 300-01 (1993) (stating that
When citizens of modest means go to the polls, they are voting for candi-
dates whose political seriousness has been determined by a money-gather-
ing process which, by definition, systematically demotes their interests. . . .
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prit.  Drawing districts has become a statistical fine art where
parties can fine tune the voting electorate and make it more
likely than not that a given district will elect a Democrat or Re-
publican.32  Even though Davis v. Bandemer33 holds the promise
that a plaintiff may challenge political gerrymandering if the dis-
trict lines are drawn to “consistently degrade” the influence of a
political minority,34 successful challenges have been virtually
non-existent.35  Free to politically gerrymander, each party has
been able to solidify gains, and minimize competition.  As a re-
sult of artful redistricting, in the 2002 elections incumbents were
winners.  Only thirty-nine of the 435 House races were competi-
tive, that is, decided by margins of less than fifty-five percent of
the vote.36  Only forty-nine House races involved a non-incum-
bent, and only thirty-five of these were competitive.37
Finally, geographically the country has become split in its party
loyalties.  The West Coast and Northeast have become Demo-
cratic, while the South is now mostly Republican.  A few states,
mostly in the Midwest, remain in play from election to election as
“swing states.”  In terms of electoral votes, this geographic split
means that Republicans and Democrats are virtually tied.
Neither party has gotten a majority of the popular vote in the last
three presidential and House elections since 1996.38  This has not
happened since the early 1900s.
Even though electoral differences are now slimmer than ever
before, in U.S. representative democracy, pluralities control the
apparatus of government.39  Post-2000, Republicans control both
chambers of Congress and the executive branch.  Republican ap-
[T]hey are part of an electoral system “arranged in a manner that will con-
sistently degrade” their influence “on the political process as a whole.”);
Smith, Race and Money in Politics , supra  note 19, at 1512 (citing studies showing
racial discrimination in campaign fund-raising).
32 See generally  Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting:  A Social Science Per-
spective , 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985).
33 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
34 Id.  at 132.
35 See generally  Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:  Reapportionment after the
2000 Census , 50 STANFORD L. REV. 731 (1998).
36 David J. Garrow, Ruining the House , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002 at A29.
37 Id .
38 In 1996, 1998, and 2000, Republicans carried the popular vote for the House by
49-48.5, 49-48, and 49-48% margins. See  Michael Barone, The 49% Nation in THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2002 21 (Michael Barone et al. eds., 2002);
Michael Barone, Whose Majority? , 54 NAT’L REV. 30, Dec. 9, 2002.
39 See generally GUINIER, TYRANNY supra  note 19.
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pointments also dominate the Supreme Court, and impending
Court replacements will be made by a Republican president com-
mitted to a conservative federal bench.40  This level of control of
government has not been seen in the United States since 1929,41
yet it was determined by less than the majority of the popular
vote.42
However, all politicians know that their grip on electoral
power is tenuous.  Structurally, this was the design that the
Founding Fathers followed when they put in play every seat in
the House of Representatives, and one-third of the Senate seats
every two years.43  In the current environment of close electoral
politics, control can shift from one party to another in one electo-
ral cycle with what is a statistical “handful” of votes.
Accordingly, in this era of ultra-competitiveness, every vote
does count.  The new politics of close margins, plus the explosive
demographic growth of Latinas/os and APIAs, has made them
the new darlings of the major political parties.  Both Democrats
and Republicans covet their vote because they are now viewed as
potential swing voters.44  A recent book, The Emerging Demo-
cratic Majority , predicts that the current tie in electoral politics
will be resolved in favor of Democrats, in part, because the La-
tina/o and APIA electorate is growing and the authors predict
their vote to continue to lean Democratic, as it did in the Bush-
40 Johnsen, supra  note 12.
41 Joshua Green, John Edwards, Esq.:  Republicans believe that Americans will
never elect a trial lawyer president. They’re wrong , WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2001, at
34.
42 Paul Glastris, How Democrats Could Have Won:  Three ideas that might have
changed the election , WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 9.
43 The key papers are Federalist No. 39, 52-77.  James Madison explained that two
year terms were sufficient in length for legislative business to be done, but brief
enough so that Representatives would always have present the interests of the vot-
ers.  The Federalist No. 52 (J. Madison).  By contrast the Senate’s six-year term al-
lows Senators to provide a check against possible excesses that might spur the House
to produce ill considered legislation.  The Federalist No. 62 (J. Madison).
44 See  Stephen Dinan, Parties Wooed Hispanics with Record Ad Spending , WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at A4 (“Republicans and Democrats alike see Hispanics as a
swing-vote population in future elections, particularly since they are such a fast-in-
creasing segment of voters”); Tamar, Jacoby, A Voting Bloc Without a Party , N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A25.  (“The courtship by both parties can only intensify in
coming elections”); Barone, Whose Majority? , supra  note 38 (stating that
Latinos vote differently in different places, depending on where they came
from and the politics they encountered in different parts of America.  If no
Latinos had voted in America, George W. Bush would have won a popu-
lar-vote plurality; but if no Latinos had voted in Florida, Al Gore would be
president.).
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Gore presidential contest.45  But Republican analysts counter
that this vote is very much in play, and is winnable by the right
appeals.46  Reportedly, Bush has directed the Republican Na-
tional Committee to make inroads with Latina/o voters, as he
views his reelection hinging on his ability to retain and increase
his margin of thirty-five percent of Latina/o voters with which he
won in 2000.47  Interestingly, it is widely speculated the next U.S.
Supreme Court appointment will be a Latina/o, in part because
an “ethnically diverse” Supreme Court will appeal to the Latina/
o electorate that President Bush believes he must capture for his
reelection.48
The geographical dispersal of Latina/o settlement, their rapid
increases, and their current perceived non-allegiance have made
Latinas/os the focus of national strategies, even more so than the
APIA vote.  Eighty percent of all Latinas/os reside in nine
“swing states,” which can decide a presidential election:  Califor-
nia (31%), Florida (8%), Texas (19%), Illinois (4%), New York
(8%), Arizona (4%), New Jersey (3%), New Mexico (2%), and
Colorado (2%).49  In Florida, Latinas/os represent the largest mi-
nority group, numbering close to 2.7 million or 16.8% of the total
45 JOHN B. JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY
(2002).  Professor Terry Smith has suggested that African Americans might contem-
plate exit from an unsatisfactory two party system, but Supreme Court case law has
undercut the possibility of such exit strategy. See  Smith, A Black Party , supra  note
19, at 70-72.
46 Barone, Whose Majority?, supra  note 38.  “Why do liberal analysts, and many
others, lump together Blacks, Latinos, and Asians—so many different peoples, with
such different experiences and heritages?” Id.  The point is, Latinos are never going
to be anything like Blacks electorally.  They will not be a 9-1 Democratic bloc.  They
will be voters for whom both parties will compete vigorously, with different proclivi-
ties in different states.  And what will happen if George W. Bush appoints a Latino
chief justice of the United States?
47 Adam Segal, Hispanic Voters Leave Imprint on 2001 Elections , JOHNS HOPKINS
J. OF AM. POL. (Feb. 2002), available at  http://www.wcjournal.org/hispanic_voters.
htm (stating “President George W. Bush’s courting of the Hispanic community has
increased in the year since his election.  While Bush won a larger portion of the
community’s vote nationally in 2000 than previous Republicans including his father,
re-election could hinge on greater support from this community.”); Jacoby, supra
note 44 (Bush carried 35% of the Latina/o vote compared to only 9% of African
American voters.).
48 Neil A. Lewis, Expecting a Vacancy, Bush Aides Weigh Supreme Court Con-
tenders , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at A1.
49 See  Bureau of Census, The Hispanic Population:  Census 2000 Brief , T.2 (May
2001) available at  http://www.census.gov/prod2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf.
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Florida population.50  In California, Latinas/os will represent the
second most significant voting block.51  The 2000 Census shows
that Latinas/os have made aggressive gains in states outside of
the Treaty of Guadalupe:  North Carolina (393%), Arkansas
(337%), and Tennessee (278%).52  All midwestern states at least
doubled the size of the Latina/o population.53 Southwest and
western states continue to show large numerical increases, partic-
ularly in Nevada, Arizona, and Utah.54  There is no reason not to
expect these current hyper-growth rates in non-Treaty of
Guadalupe states to continue, as the factors that are drawing La-
tina/o settlement will continue into the near future.55
By comparison APIAs are more regionally concentrated, as
eighty percent of all APIAs live in five solidly Democratic states:
Hawaii (58% is APIA), along the west coast—California (12%)
and Washington (7%), and on the east coast—New York (6%)
and New Jersey (6%).56  APIAs outside of Hawaii are residen-
tially dispersed, which means that it is more difficult to identify
districts where the APIA vote would dominate.57  This difference
in dispersal and residential concentration makes the APIA vote
appear as less of a cohesive voting block and may explain why
50 Southwest Voter Registration Project, SVREP’s and PRLDEF’s Redistricting
Plan , available at  http://www.svrep.org/redistricting.html.
51 Jack Citrin & Benjamin Highton, How Race, Ethnicity and Immigration Shape
the California Electorate , CAL. J. OF THE PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Dec. 2002).
The authors predict that Whites will continue to be the majority of the electorate,
even though Latina/o population will outpace those of Whites in California.  “[F]or
every Latino who casts a ballot in 2040, there will be two Whites.”  Jack Citrin &
Benjamin Highton, When the Sleeping Giant is Awake , available at  http://www.ppic.
org/main/commentary.asp?I=261 (commenting on the conclusion made by Citrin &
Highton in their article, How Race, Ethnicity and Immigration Shape the California
Electorate).
52 See  U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Profiles 2000  (2000), available at  http://
censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/pct/pctProfile.pl.
53 “Kansas’ Latina/o population doubled from 93,670 in 1990 to 188,252 in 2000
(100%); Nebraska’s Latino population grew from 36,969 to 94,425 (155%); Iowa’s
population grew from 32,647 to 82,473 (152%); and Missouri’s Latinas/os doubled
from 61,702 in 1990 to 118,592 in 2000 (92%).”  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, The “Latina/
o-ization” of the Midwest: Cambio De Colores (Change of Colors) as Agromaquilas
Expand into the Heartland , 13 LA RAZA L.J. 343 (2002) (citing Census data).
54 The Hispanic Population:  Census 2000 Brief , supra  note 49.
55 See  Lazos Vargas, supra  note 53 (noting that the Latina/o immigrants are arriv-
ing because of plentiful jobs and settling outside of the Treaty states because they
find other states to have living conditions that they find desirable).
56 Asian Population , supra  note 22.
57 Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation:  A Comparison of
the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected
Officials , 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 48 (2002).
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APIAs are getting less attention as a potential electorate at a
national level.58
Merchants of the minority vote59 have been hard at work mak-
ing arguments that minorities are relevant in two-party, winner
take all, electoral politics.  The Toma´s Rivera Policy Institute re-
ported that Latina/o voters were growing most rapidly in South-
ern California with 400,000 new Latina/o voters added to the
rolls since 1996.60  The William C. Velazquez Institute argued
that Latina/o voter turnout in the 2002 elections in Texas was
high with eighty-nine percent voting for Tony Sanchez.61  Na-
tional Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials
(NALEO) suggested that the Latina/o vote made a difference in
the runs for Congress in New Mexico, Nevada, and Colorado.62
The Pew Hispanic Center’s recent report on the Latina/o electo-
rate concludes that Latinas/os are “emerging as a distinct pres-
ence on the political landscape.”63  Similarly, the National Asian
Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) in Washington
D.C. reported high turnout rates among APIA voters in Califor-
nia.64  Groups such as MALDEF, the Southwest Voter Registra-
tion Project, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
58 The APIA vote is significant in states where APIAs are concentrated. See , e.g. ,
Aoki, supra  note 19 (discussing the influence of the APIA vote in Monterey Park,
California).
59 Cf . DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992) (describ-
ing the role of the merchant minority).
60 See Toma´s Rivera Policy Institute, Presidential Politics & Voter Turnout , availa-
ble at  http://www.trpi.org/politics.html.
61 See  Rebeca Rodriguez, Hispanic Voting Profile Disputed , SAN ANTONIO EX-
PRESS NEWS, Nov. 9, 2002, at 1B (reporting that the William C. Velazquez Institute is
arguing that Latino voter turnout was high and eighty-nine percent voted for con-
tender Tony Sanchez, while Republican pollsters report that only sixty-five percent
voted for Sanchez).
62 See  Press Release, Latinos Capture Key Elected Offices (Nov. 6, 2002) availa-
ble at  http://www.nalco.org/press_releases/latino_capture_key_elected_offices.pdf
(suggesting that Latino vote would make a difference in the runs for congressional
district in New Mexico, Nevada and Colorado and might determine the balance or
power in Congress). But see  William Schneider, The Hispanic Power Outage , Natl
J., Dec. 7, 2002 (quoting political consultant Sergio Bendixen as stating that Latino
turnout was down in California, Florida, and Colorado), available at  http://
www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2002/vol6n51/HispPowerOutage-en.shtml.
63 Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, National Survey of Latinos:
The Latino Electorate (Oct. 2002) (available at  http://www.pewhispanic.org/
page.jsp?page=report [hereinafter Latino Electorate].
64 May Chow, Exit Polls Show APA Dems and GOPs Equal in Southern Califor-
nia , ASIAN WEEK, Nov. 29-Dec. 5, 2002, available at  http://www.asianweek.com/
2002_11_29/bay_polls.html.
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Fund, and the Hispanic Coalition on Reapportionment, among
many others, lobbied and litigated to shape how state representa-
tive and congressional district boundary lines were drawn, which
resulted in increased opportunities for Latinos to be elected to
state and federal offices in many states.
In the 2002 campaign, Republican politicians assiduously
courted the Latina/o vote.65  The Republican party alone spent
sixteen million, and both parties spent twenty million dollars in
ads pitched to Latinas/os.66  Latina/o media advertisers advised
the party bosses that “feel good” messages rather than attack ads
were more appropriate for the ethnic vote, and according to a
study, nine out of ten ads pitched at Latinas/os in the 2002 ad
campaign were positive.67  The Republican party has been pro-
ducing a TV news magazine, a half-hour program entitled
Abriendo Caminos , which airs in Albuquerque, Denver, Fresno,
Miami, Las Vegas, and Orlando, touting the Republican agenda
and President Bush.68  The Bush brothers campaign with Spanish
snippets and pitches to their “amigos,” salsa and mariachi mu-
sic.69  They visibly court Latina/o community leaders.70  Both are
personally popular within the Latina/o community, and view the
Latina/o vote as key to their electoral victories.71
65 Associated Press, Jonathan D. Salant, GOP Aggressively Seeks Hispanic Vote
(Oct. 3, 2002), available at  http://www.como.org/gop_aggressively_seeks_hispanic_
vote.htm; Chuck Raasch, Impact of growing Hispanic vote may be seen mostly in
governor’s races , USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2002; Deborah Kong, Latino voters resist
party loyalty; activists call for more diverse Democratic leadership , LA PRENSA, Nov.
13, 2002, at 3, available at  http://laprensatoledo.com/PDF/Nov.%2013.pdf.
66 Adam Segal, More Than $16 Million Was Spent in 2002 on Spanish-Language
Political Television Advertising, Setting Election-Year Record , JOHNS HOPKINS J. OF
AM. POL. (Nov  2002), available at  http://www.wcjournal.org/FinalSpanishTV.htm.
67 See id.  (reporting that nine out of ten ads pitched to Latinas/os were positive).
68 See  Salant, supra  note 65.
69 See , e.g. , M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Playing ‘mariachi politics’; Democrat chairman
criticizes Bush, Calls Tancredo ‘Extremist,’ ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 10, 2002,
at 5A (reporting that Terry Maucaliffe (quoting Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Col.)) ac-
cused President Bush of “mariachi politics” when Bush invited Hispanic leaders to
the White House for a Hispanic Heritage Month event and peppered his remarks
with Spanish); Associated Press, Bush dances salsa and McBride claps to gospel at
campaign stops  (Oct. 6, 2002), available at  http://www.firstcoastnews.com/politics/
articles/2002-10-06/bush_mcbride.asp.
70 A recent press report, for example, ventured that Bush increasingly wanted to
be seen with Latin American Presidents, like Vicente Fox, in order to improve his
standing and that of the Republican party with Latino voters.  Andres Oppen-
heimer, Bush’s Latin American Trip Really aimed at US Latin Voters , MIAMI HER-
ALD, Mar. 22, 2002, at 5A.
71 Marı´a T. Padilla, Hispanics Get Involved on Election Day , ORLANDO SENTI-
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Recent political events indicate even more so that the major
parties see their electoral victories as tied in part to their success
in wooing the Latina/o and other minorities.  In the recent Trent
Lott controversy, the Bush White House was given credit for cat-
apulting Lott quickly.  Why?  The Washington wisdom was that it
was important to Bush to continue to remake the image of
Republicans as minority friendly.72
B. Latinas/os and APIAs:  The Potential Electorate
Latinas/os and APIAs are influential as potential electorates
because of two factors:  (1) Up to ten million Latinas/os and
APIAs will become voters within the next decade and one-half;
and, (2) Their party affiliation is not yet set.
1. Crouching Jaguar, Hidden Dragon:  The Soon-to-be
Latina/o and APIA Voter
The Latina/o and APIA vote is being valued more than before
because much of this population currently cannot vote, but will
be in a position to cast a ballot within the next decade and a half.
The number of potential voters that could come on-line within
the next decade and a half is up to seven million.  As discussed
below, this calculation is based on the present number of nonci-
tizens and the proportion who eventually naturalize.73
Becoming a citizen and registering are prerequisites in every
state to being able to vote in state and national elections.
Upwards of fifty percent of Latina/o foreign-born residents who
remain in the United Stated States fifteen or more years become
NEL, Nov. 13, 2002, at B1 (reporting that Gov. Jeb Bush sprinted to the finish line
with sixty percent of the Hispanic vote, because he had worked “the Hispanic vote
hard,” and concluding that “Republicans are succeeding at wooing non-Cuban His-
panic voters.”). See also  Mark Schlueb and Kelly Brewington, Bush wins Hispanic
support; McBride fails to woo black voters , ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2002, at A1
(reporting that Jeb Bush won in all majority Latino/a precincts in Florida, including
Central Florida where Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and Central Americans domi-
nate); see also  Dinan, supra  note 44.
72 Editorial, Fire Trent Lott , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A38:
No one has put more effort than George W. Bush into ending the image of
the Republican Party as a whites-only haven.  For all the disagreement that
many African-Americans have with his policies, few can doubt Mr. Bush’s
commitment to a multiracial America.  But unless the president wants to
spend his next campaign explaining the majority leader’s behavior over and
over, he should urge Senate Republicans to get somebody else for the job.
73 See  discussion infra  note 74 & accompanying text.
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U.S. citizens by naturalization.74  APIAs naturalize at greater
rates than Latinas/os.75  Latinas/os, because of settlement factors
such as proximity to their home countries, historically have been
from one-half to two-thirds less likely to naturalize than other
groups, regardless of length of time residing in the United
States.76  But recent studies indicate that this historical reluc-
tance to naturalize is changing.  The Pew Hispanic Trust’s poll
data reports that two-thirds of Latinas/os who are not presently
eligible to vote are planning to or are currently applying for citi-
zenship.77  This is a rate fifty percent higher than the historical
census data.  Louis De Sipio reports that Latina/o immigrants are
increasingly developing a psychological attachment to the United
States, which spurs them to want to naturalize.78  In a national
survey, more than ninety-five percent of Latino immigrants indi-
cated that they wanted to make the United States their home,79
which signals naturalization rates increasing in the future.  Per-
haps more importantly Latinos have reacted to anti-immigration
74 According to census data, 51.2% of foreign born who have resided in the
United States 15 to 19 years naturalize, and 71.1% of those who reside 20 or more
years naturalize.  Bureau of Census, Profile of Foreign Born Population in the United
States:  2000  (Dec. 2001) at 21 Fig. 7-2, available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/2002
pubs/p23-206.pdf. [hereinafter Census of Foreign Born].
75 Id . at 20.
76 For the foreign born residing in the United States 5 to 9 years the naturalization
rates for the at-large population is 13.2% as compared to 6.2% for Mexican and
Central Americans; for length of residency of 10 to 14 years, the rates are 29.4% vs.
14.2%; for length of residency of 15 to 19 years, 51.2% vs. 28.9%; for length of
residency of 20 years or more, 71% vs. 47%. Id . at Fig. 7-2, 20-21.  Latina/o low
rates of naturalization are related to their continuing national identity with their
country of origin.  Because they enjoy closer proximity, Latin American foreign na-
tionals can easily return “home” and cement their ties with their country of origin.
They can thus tell themselves that their stay in the United States is temporary, while
their true home (their national identity) remains with their country of origin. ALE-
JANDRO PORTES & RUBE´N B. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA:  A PORTRAIT 17-20
(1990). But see infra  notes 79-82 (noting trends towards increasing naturalization).
77 See Latino Electorate , supra  note 63, at Chart 4.
78 Louis DeSipio, The Engine of Latino Growth:  Latin American Immigration and
Settlement in the United States in PURSUING POWER:  LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM 314-42 (F. Chris Garcia ed., 1997).
79 There are currently 12.8 million Latinas/os who are foreign born and 74.3% of
them are noncitizens, equalling 9.5 million noncitizen Latins/os. See Profile of For-
eign Born , supra  note 74, at 24 & Fig. 9-2.  If naturalization rates hold, approxi-
mately half after 7.3 years will naturalize and 4.9 million will become U.S. citizens if
they remain 15 to 19 years.  In the case of APIAs, there are currently 6.7 million
who are foreign born, id.  at 24, and 61.3% are noncitizens, id.  at Fig. 9.2, equalling
4.1 million noncitizen APIAs.  If naturalization rates hold, 47.1% or two million will
become U.S. citizens. Id. See also infra  notes 145-48 & accompanying text.
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movements, like Proposition 187 and the Newt Gingrich “Con-
tract with America,” which cut back social benefits available to
permanent resident aliens, by perceiving great incentives towards
naturalization.80
Based on such figures, Latinas/os and APIAs are the single
most important future voting block in the United States.  In the
next fifteen years, there are five million new potential  Latina/o
voters and two million potential APIA voters—if current trends
hold.81  If naturalization rates increase for Latinas/os, per a new
upward trend that social scientists are reporting, then the number
of future Latina/o and APIA voters could increase even more.
By contrast, growth rates in the voting electorate of African
Americans, white men, and white women are stable.82
Latinas/os and APIAs must still register in order to vote.  Cur-
rent data indicate that registration of Latinas/os and APIAs has
been growing.  Over the last eighteen years, Latinas/os have be-
come the fastest growing voting group in Florida.83  Commenta-
tors view Jeb Bush’s ability to win the newly registered Latina/o
voter—Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Central American—as the key
to his gubernatorial victory.84  In southern California, Latinas/os
are the fastest growing voting block.  According to the Toma´s
Rivera Policy Institute, between 1994 and 1998, the Latina/o vote
in Los Angeles County grew by over 100,000 votes, which
amounted to an increase of nearly fifty percent in just four
years.85  Over the same period, the non-Latina/o vote grew by
just ten percent.86  In California during the last decade, Latina/o
voters began the 1990s as nine percent of the voting population
and grew to fourteen percent by 2000.87
80 See JUDIS & TEIXEIRA, supra  note 45.
81 Id.  at 330 (reporting on the National Latino Immigrant Survey conducted in
1989-90).
82 Harry P. Pachon, Latino Politics in the Golden State:  Ready for the 21st Cen-
tury? , in RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA, VOL. II 419 (Michael B.
Preston et al. eds., 1998).
83 SVREP’s and PRLDEF’s Redistricting Plan , supra  note 50 (reporting “[Latina/
o] registration at 241.8% from ’80-’96 and, from ’82-’98, the Gubernatorial election
cycle, Latino participation grew 251.2%.”).
84 See supra  note 71.
85 Toma´s Rivera Policy Institute, supra  note 60 (reporting on TRPI/La Opinion
Poll, 1/28/00). See also  Citrin & Highton, supra  note 51.
86 Toma´s Rivera Policy Institute, supra  note 60.
87 Citrin & Highton, supra  note 51.  This report notes that the LA Times  exit poll
for November 2002 reflected that Latinas/os made up only ten percent of the electo-
rate in California in this last cycle.
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Nevertheless, Latina/o registration lags by as much as fourteen
and fifteen percentage points behind the registration rates for
Whites.88  This is due primarily to class and age demographic fac-
tors; the Latina/o population overall is more youthful, less well-
off, and has a lower educational attainment than the general pop-
ulation.89  These are all factors that influence voting behavior.
When these factors are controlled in White and Latina/o popula-
tions, these two groups vote at the same rates.90  Moreover, there
is also evidence that “the current maze of laws and administra-
tive procedures . . . suppresses voter turnout. . . .”91  Institutional
“unfriendly” factors disproportionately affect Latinas/os, a group
which overall has lower levels of educational attainment and un-
familiarity with the English language than the population at
large.92
Changing registration propensity, given class and age back-
ground, is something that the Latina/o civil rights groups have
been fighting hard to change, but that still requires further ef-
forts.93  The Latina/o “backlash” to anti-immigration proposi-
tions in California and the anti-bilingual education initiatives in
Massachusetts have spurred greater political activism.94
Both Democrats and Republicans are trying to make inroads
as these voters come on-line.  Experts agree that with each elec-
88 De la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1500 (reporting on 1993 data); John
A. Garcia & Carlos Arce, Political Orientation and Behaviors:  Trying to Make Sense
Out of Attitudes and Participation , in LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (F.
Chris Garcia ed., 1988); John A. Garcia, Political Participation:  Resources and Im-
provement Among Latinos in the American Political System , in PURSUING POWER,
supra  note 78 (finding same based on 1988 data), at 64-65; RODNEY E. HERO, LATI-
NOS AND THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM:  TWO-TIERED PLURALISM 56-64 (1992).
89 See  Melissa Therrien & Roberto R. Ramirez, U.S. Census Bureau, The His-
panic Populaton in the United States:  March 2002  (2001), available at  http://
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/p20-535/p20-535.pdf.
90 De la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1503-04 (also reporting on other
studies); Citrin & Highton, supra  note 51 (reporting that Latinas/os in California
register at higher rates than their white counterparts given class, noncitizenship and
age factors, but nevertheless in the aggregate still fall behind white registration).
91 HERO, supra  note 88, at 63 (quoting Maria A. Calvo and Steven J. Rosenstone,
Southwest Voter Research Institute, Hispanic Political Participation  (1989)).
92 Id.  at 79; Therrien & Ramirez, supra  note 89.
93 See  de la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1506 (reporting that fifty-six per-
cent of all Latina/o respondents who had been contacted by voting drives had regis-
tered but also noting that the vast majority of respondents had not been reached by
registration efforts); HERO, supra  note 88, at 71-78.
94 See supra  note 76-80; Cindy Rodriguez, Activists Encouraged by Turnout of La-
tinos , BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2002, at A1 (reporting very high turnout in Massa-
chusetts because of Unz-sponsored anti-bilingual education initiative).
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toral cycle, Latinas/os and APIAs will see more campaign adver-
tisements pitched in their own languages and through ethnic
media.95
2. Not Yet Committed to a Major Political Party
Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio note that partisan af-
filiation takes years to develop.96  Recent immigrants, those who
are not yet citizens, do not consistently vote Democratic or Re-
publican.  Similar results are being documented in the APIA
community.  National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium
reported that in Orange County, California, the APIA vote was
evenly split among Democrats and Republicans, and increasingly
California APIAs identify themselves as “independents.”97
Among Latinas/os who are not yet registered and those who are
planning on becoming U.S. citizens, the number of independents
and Republicans is greater than the number of Democrats.98
This reflects that recent Latina/o immigrants are more conserva-
tive on religious and social issues than native-born Latinas/os,99
making recent immigrants’ positions on these issues closely al-
igned to Republican party policies.  On the other hand, Latinas/
os who have been in the United States for several generations
have more secure party affiliations.  Party propensity by national
origin groups shows that Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Mexi-
can Americans have mostly voted Democratic, while Cuban
Americans have mostly voted Republican.100
Rather than being party affiliated, the Latina/o and APIA vote
is increasingly tied to issues.  The Pew Hispanic Trust’s poll data
95 See  Segal, supra  note 66.
96 De la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26.
97 Chow, supra  note 64.
98 Latino Electorate , supra  note 63, at Chart 11.  Among Latinas/os who are U.S.
citizens but not registered voters, 10% report being Republican and 32% report
being Independents, as compared to 31% who report being Democrats.  Among La-
tinas/os who are planning on becoming U.S. citizens, 14% report being Republican
and 35% report being Independents, as compared to 22% who report being
Democrats.
99 Id . at Chart 14.  The social issues that Latinas/os were polled on were abortion,
gay and lesbian relationships, having children outside of marriage, and divorce.  U.S.
born Latinas/os were less conservative on these issues (from ten to fifteen percent-
age points), but still more conservative than Whites (from five to fifteen percentage
points).
100 Id.  at Chart 5 (reporting that 66% of Dominicans, 52% of Puerto Ricans and
49% of Mexican Americans were registered as Democrats, while 54% of Cuban
Americans were registered as Republicans).
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shows what was already common knowledge within the Latina/o
community that Latinas/os base their votes on substantive policy,
and that the most important issues to Latinas/os are immigration,
education, the economy, and health care.101  The NAPALC re-
ports that APIA voters were concerned with policies that might
have possible negative impacts on the immigrant community.102
Thus, indications are that Latinas/os and APIAs judge candidates
by substantive political proposals and initiatives.
Immigration and language are two key policy areas that have
done much to galvanize political consciousness among Latinas/os
and APIAs.  As a group, Latinas/os favor immigration policies
that would open up family reunification with Latin America and
would provide amnesty to current undocumented workers.103
APIA exit polls in the recent California elections, for example,
show that although the vote went with Governor Davis this time
around, APIAs remain watchful of future policies regarding
treatment of recent immigrants and on immigration issues gener-
ally.104  Language issues are also very important.  Latinas/os
have opposed laws that would make it more difficult for children
to maintain their cultural language (i.e., rapid English immersion
programs), although overwhelmingly, recent immigrants indicate
that they believe it is important to speak English in order to suc-
ceed in the United States.105
C. “Salsa” Appeal or Anti-Subordination Politics?
Does being courted translate into new direction in policy ini-
tiatives designed to better the social and economic conditions of
racial and ethnic minorities?  This may be a glass half-empty,
half-full answer.
101 When registered Latina/o voters were asked to name the two most important
issues in determining their vote, the top issue was education (58%), followed by the
economy (39%), health care (23%), and Social Security (20%).  Among foreign
born Latina/o voters, 68% said that education was the most important issue deciding
their vote. Id  at 9. See also HERO, supra  note 88, at 155-72 (listing immigration,
education, health, housing, and language as the key substantive policy areas im-
pacting Latinas/os).
102 Chow, supra  note 64.
103 Latino Electorate , supra  note 63, at Chart 21 (eighty-five percent favor am-
nesty and sixty-eight percent favor guest worker program).
104 Chow, supra  note 64.
105 See Part IV infra .  Kaiser Family Foundation & Pew Hispanic Center, 2002
National Survey of Latinos (Dec. 2002) at Chart 3.4 [hereinafter 2002 Pew Latina/o
Survey].
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Studies have shown that Latinas/os wield remarkably little in-
fluence on policies at the national level.  Using regression analy-
sis, political scientists Rodney Hero and Caroline Tolbert
concluded that there was “little or no Latino substantive repre-
sentation” on the House of Representatives individual voting
patterns.106  The tenor of the conversation has changed, however,
as the major parties are incorporating initiatives calculated to
stand them in good stead with the Latina/o and APIA electo-
rate.107  During the pre-election months of September and Octo-
ber 2002, Senator Orrin Hatch (Rep.-Utah) championed the
DREAM bill, legislation important to Latinas/os since it would
allow noncitizen children of undocumented workers to go to col-
lege by making them eligible for in-state tuition and federal
grants.108  This bill went no further than being reported favorably
out of the Senate Judiciary committee.109  The Republican con-
trolled Congress has not made the DREAM bill part of their
2003-04 legislative package.  On the Democratic side of the
ledger, 2004 Democratic Party Presidential candidate, Dick
Gephardt, four weeks before the November 2002 elections, intro-
duced an amnesty bill that would legalize the status of undocu-
mented workers who had lived for five consecutive years and
worked for two years in the United States.110
Republicans and Democrats accuse each other of engaging in
platitudes and not offering substantive policies which are likely
to be sustained.  For example, Gephardt’s proposal was attacked
as “a naked public relations stunt . . . to counteract the slide in
106 HERO, supra  note 88, at 194-206 (concluding that Latina/o influence is mainly
restricted to local politics and that the more national the political environment, the
less likely Latinas/os would be influential); Rodney E. Hero & Caroline J. Tolbert,
Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives:  Direct,
Indirect, or Nonexistent? , in PURSUING POWER, supra  note 78, at 265.
107 Hero & Tolbert, supra  note 106, at 268 (using voting scores published by the
Southwest Voters Registration Instate to measure alignment with substantive La-
tina/o policy).
108 Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM) S.1291,
107th Congress (2002).
109 DREAM Bill Summary & Status S.1291, 107th Congress (2002), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d107:1:./temp/
~bd0iCo:@@@L&summ2=m&1/bss/d107query.html/.
110 Sergio Bustos, Top Dem’s Immigration Move Shakes Up House , GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 11, 2002, available at  http://www.latinobeat.net/html/101.402bi.
htm.  Under Gephardt’s proposal, undocumented immigrants would undergo back-
ground checks and would need to prove they lived continuously in the United States
for at least five years and worked for at least two.
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their popularity with Hispanic voters.”111  It is true that, in the
past, minorities have not been able to steer substantive policy
initiatives in Congress.112  Only the future will tell whether the
Republicans and Democrats will commit political capital to make
substantive policy changes, such as the DREAM bill and am-
nesty program, that are wanted by most of the Latina/o and
APIA communities and would move national politics beyond
mere “salsa” appeal platitudes.
Some have suggested that the potential Latina/o and APIA
electorate, which is highly sensitive to anti-immigration policies
and anti-nativistic sentiments, might play a moderating influ-
ence.113  Latina/o and APIA voters remain wary of major party
candidates and their positions on immigration, because they un-
derstand that anti-nativistic sentiments stirred up by nativistic
rhetoric easily spills over to hostility toward Latina/o and APIA
U.S. citizens.114  The guest worker program, which Mexico’s
President Vicente Fox pushed; a new amnesty program for un-
documented workers, which is supported by eighty-five percent
of all Latinas/os;115 and immigration family reunification reform,
which impacts “mixed” families, those with citizen and noncitizen
children or parents, perhaps had a chance of being part of the
Bush legislative agenda pre-9/11, but no more.  Instead, anti-im-
migration groups have become more prominent as they link anti-
111 Id .
112 See supra  note 107 and accompanying text. Cf. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARA-
DOX OF REPRESENTATION:  RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS
IN CONGRESS 99-124 (1997) (concluding that post Voting Rights Act 1980 and 1990
elections increased Latina/o and African American descriptive representation
(elected representatives) in Congress but harmed substantive representation (poli-
cies) because racically drawn districts had made it more likely that conservative
Republicans be elected in the south rather than moderate Democrats).
113 Jacoby, supra  note 44.
114 Following the enactment of Proposition 187, the Los Angeles County Commis-
sion of Human Relations (CHIRLA) indicated an increase of 23.5% in hate crimes
against Latinas/os.  Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed:  Los Angeles in the Af-
termath of Proposition 187 , 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).  It concluded
that:
[Proposition] 187 [has] transformed everyday life for Latinos of every sta-
tus, including those born here and those whose ancestors had lived in the
U.S. for generations. The climate of hostility resulted in discrimination in
business establishments, increased police abuse, heightened conflict among
neighbors, and an increase in hate crimes and hate speech against Latinos.
. . . There is abundant evidence of anti-Asian hate activity. . . .
Id. at 9.  See also Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race
Relations:  A “Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness , 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998).
115 See supra  note 90.
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immigration initiatives to homeland security goals.116  Mark
Krikorian, Executive Director for the Center for Immigration
Studies, argues that strict immigration enforcement must be part
of the post-9/11 homeland security effort because “Islamic ter-
rorists have penetrated every aspect of our immigration sys-
tem.”117  The White House’s concerns with reelection might be
keeping at bay the more extreme anti-noncitizen and anti-immi-
grant proposals.  There have been reports that the Bush White
House reined in Ashcroft’s Justice Department on an aggressive
initiative inviting local law enforcement to become part of the
immigration enforcement network.118  However, the Ashcroft
proposal has not been taken off the table; the only “moderating
influence” that the White House’s concern with the Latina/o and
APIA vote might have played is that the Ashcroft initiative has
been downplayed.  While it is true that the major parties’ per-
ceived importance of the Latina/o and APIA vote has played
some  moderating influence, it is difficult to take comfort from
knowing that only extreme actions have been halted while no
progress has been made on so many other fronts calling for eq-
uity and justice reforms.
D. Going Beyond the Black-White Paradigm
In embarking on creating a meaningful scholarship in the elec-
toral context, LatCrit must construct a concept of race that
avoids the pitfalls of falling into Black-White bipolar analyses.
Mainstream descriptions of APIA and Latina/o voters—general-
izations about their characteristics as voter groups—often fall
into the bipolar logic of the Black-White paradigm.  These ascrip-
tions and simplistic generalizations parallel the “model minority”
pigeon-holing that Asian Americans have experienced in the
context of the affirmative action debate.  Following are three ex-
amples of these simplistic, racialized, generalizations.
116 See  Marcelo Ballve, Will Immigration Reform Help the U.S. Fight Terrorism? ,
PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 31, 2002.  Ballve reports that immigration expert
Wayne Cornelius commented that 9/11 was a “godsend” to anti-immigrant groups;
“they’ve been resuscitated,” available at  http://www.alternet.org/story.html?
StorylD=14433.
117 Mark Krikorian, Immigration Inaction , NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2002,
available at  http://www.nationalreviewonline.com/comment/comment-Krikorian03
1102.shtml.  Krikorian has also been quoted as saying that “[i]mmigrant communi-
ties provide the cover for bad guys from overseas.”  Ballve, supra  note 116.
118 Eric Schmitt, Administration Split on Local Role in Terror Fight , N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2002, at A1.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 25  7-OCT-03 8:40
The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000 807
1. Ethnics not Racial Groups
Professor Peter Schuck, a respected immigration scholar who
teaches at Yale, commented on Latina/o and APIA voting
power:
[A]liens and their ethnic compatriots who are citizens are con-
centrated in a handful of states. . . . In at least some of those
states, such as California, Texas, and New York, these ethnic
groups, sometimes even including the disenfranchised aliens
themselves, exert considerable influence upon local, state,
congressional, and even presidential politics.119
It is hard to understand on what basis Schuck asserts that La-
tinas/os and APIAs “exert considerable [electoral and political]
influence,” since he cites no authority and the data indicates the
contrary.  The fact alone that Proposition 187 passed in Califor-
nia should be sufficient to show how specious Professor Schuck’s
remark is.  The conceptual heavy lifting for this comment comes
with a deft rhetorical move, his categorizing Latinas/os and
APIAs as “ethnic” rather than racial groups.  With this re-label-
ing, Professor Schuck waves off the history of Jim Crow practices
that Latinas/os and APIAs suffered in the very states where Pro-
fessor Schuck claims their “ethnic” vote wields “considerable in-
fluence.”  Congress extended the Voting Rights Act to Latinas/os
and APIAs premised on its factual findings that Jim Crow prac-
tices against Latinas/os in Texas and APIAs in California were
extensive, and required legal protections.120  By classifying La-
tinas/os and APIAs as ethnic groups, Professor Schuck instead
recalls the success of the Irish “becoming White” by capturing
political machinery in major urban centers, like New York and
Chicago, within one generation of their settlement during the
Great Immigration of 1880-1892.121  However, Irish Americans
never suffered through legalized Jim Crow, and their success in
making inroads to political power in urban centers at the turn of
the century cannot be replicated given modern electoral
119 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law , 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 23 (1984).
120 De la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1492-93; Robert Beischetto, David
R. Richards, Chandler Davidson & Berard Grofman, Texas, in QUIET REVOLUTION
IN THE SOUTH:  THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, 235-37, 243
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
121 See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); DAVID R. ROE-
DIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS:  RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991).
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structures.122
Professor Schuck’s off-hand comment that the vote of “ethnic
compatriots who are citizens” can offset noncitizen discrimina-
tion also misunderstands the complex relationship between La-
tina/o and APIA citizens and noncitizens.  There is no identity of
political interests between these two groups, and increasingly
there is evidence of deep cleavages between the two.123  Consoli-
dating such diverse groups and homogenizing them into a mono-
lithic coalition through rhetorical labeling is a form of
essentializing that minimizes the American-ness of “ethnic com-
patriots,” and erases the subordination of Latina/o noncitizens.
Moreover, rhetorical labeling dismisses serious scholarly argu-
ments that Latina/o and APIA noncitizens should be viewed as
an insular minority.124
The manipulation of race versus ethnic ascriptions “whitens”
Latinas/os and APIAs.  Racial discrimination, structural subordi-
nation, and unconscious transactional stereotyping are erased.
The ethnic ascription causes Latinas/os and APIAs to disappear
in the context of discussions about Jim Crow laws.125  They are
converted from racial minorities worthy of more exacting judicial
review under the theory of Carolene Products  to just another in-
terest group that is struggling for political power and influence
and thus worthy of only rational basis scrutiny in judicial re-
view.126  The model minority rhetoric makes it possible for legal
scholars and courts to minimize, and even ignore, Latinas/os and
APIAs’ civil rights and anti-subordination claims.
122 Cf . Deborah C. Malamud, The Jew Taboo:  Jewish Difference and the Affirma-
tive Action Debate , 59 OHIO ST L.J. 915 (1998) (making these points with respect to
African American vis a vis Jews).
123 See Latino Electorate , supra  note 63 (noting cleavages in party affiliation, atti-
tudes toward social sigues, party affiliation, etc); DAVID G. GUTIE´RREZ, WALLS AND
MIRRORS:  MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
ETHNICITY 217 (1995) (noting fragmentation regarding support of Proposition 187).
124 See  discussion infra  Pt. II.
125 Pat Chew describes how Asian Americans “have been victims of lynching, race
riots, and slavery,” methods of subjugation that are widely known to have been used
to oppress Blacks.  Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans:  The “Reticent” Minority and
Their Paradoxes , 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9 (1994); Carbado, supra  note 20, at
1310-11.
126 This is one way to understand Scalia’s critique of the affirmative action set
aside program invalidated in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-
38 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstruct-
ing Homo[geneous] Americanus:  The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Ex-
clusionary Effect , 72 TULANE L. REV. 1493, 1529-30 (1998) (discussing Scalia
concurrence) [hereinafter Lazos Vargas, White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative].
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2. Racial Hierarchy and the White Ethnic Narrative
Michael Barone, a leading conservative columnist, recently
criticized “liberal analysts . . . [who] lump together Blacks, Lati-
nos, and Asians.”  He explains that this occurs:
Because there is an underlying assumption that this is still a
country full of white racists and that people whom we classify
as being of a different race will share a common experience of
racial discrimination.  But this is not a racist country anymore,
and the discrimination blacks and Latinos most commonly en-
counter is discrimination in their favor, thanks to racial quotas
and preferences and to employers’ preferences for hardwork-
ing Latino and high-talent Asian workers.127
In this comment Barone flat out denies that there is any dis-
crimination or racism in the United States, in spite of extensive
social science findings to the contrary.  In fact the only discrimi-
nation Barone believes is experienced in the United States is suf-
fered by “innocent whites” who must withstand affirmative
action.128  Barone is deploying the potential  electoral power that
he ascribes to Latina/o and APIA voters to reinvigorate the
claim of white racial innocence.  Because Latinas/os and APIAs
may  exercise some erstwhile electoral power, “this is not a racist
country anymore.”129  Latinas/os and APIAs are not victims of
any past or current racism, but instead are empowered because
Latinas/os are “hardworking”130 (But are they smart?) and
APIAs are “high-talent”131 (But are they socially clued in?).  Ra-
cism exists only because “[White] liberal analysts”132 want it to
exist, not because it actually happens.  Individuals suffer individ-
ual  discrimination; it is a myth that “people whom we classify as
being of a different race . . . share a common experience of racial
discrimination.”133  Under this logic, group claims regarding dis-
127 Barone, Whose Majority? , supra  note 38.
128 Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action , 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990)
(explaining that the affirmative action debate is framed in the rhetoric of “white
innocence” and that this avoids dealing with problems of unconscious racism); STE-
PHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED:  HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (stating that ability to avoid consequences of racial
power is a form of White privilege); Lazos Vargas, White Ethnic Immigrant Narra-
tive , supra  note 126, 1522-43 (describing how the White ethnic immigrant narrative
is deployed in the affirmative action debate).
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crimination or lack of meaningful representation under the Vot-
ing Rights Act, should be invalid.
Barone’s compliment to Latinas/os and APIAs as “hardwork-
ing” and “high-talent,”134 although positive, recalls stereotypes,
essentializes and positions Asian Americans and Latinas/os in
the ambiguous ground of not being White, yet not being Black.135
This narrative defines race and racial identity oppositionally. La-
tinas/os and APIAs are “ethnic” groups versus the “racial” group
that African Americans undoubtedly compose.  As opposed to
Blacks, Latinas/os and APIAs do not vote monolithically or sin-
gle-mindedly as Democrats.  This positions Latinas/os and
APIAs outside of a racial dialogue.  As Professor Bob Chang has
described, this is a “complimentary facade . . . [that] works a dual
harm by (1) denying the existence of present-day discrimination
against Asian Americans and the present-day effects of past dis-
crimination, and (2) legitimizing the oppression of other racial
minorities and poor Whites.”136  The immigrant narrative as ap-
plied to Latinas/os and APIAs brings them inside the value sys-
tem of the white ethnic narrative, the dominant cultural narrative
in our country,137 but also hides some hard truths about racial
politics and political inequities.
3. Model Minorities:  Stereotyping and Essentializing
Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami’s contribution expressly rejects any
model minority stereotyping that might be ascribed to the activist
efforts of the Coalition of Asian Pacific Americans for Fair Re-
districting (CAPAFR) in the 2000 California redistricting ef-
fort,138 which they document in their Symposium contribution.
Their article captures a moment when California assemblyman
John Longville complimented the APIA community’s efforts in
134 Id.
135 Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African Ameri-
can/Korean American Conflict:  How We Constructed “Los Angeles ,” 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1581 (1993); Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and Racial Stratification , in MAP-
PING MULTICULTURALISM 238, 246 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds.,
1996); Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black? , 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999); William R.
Tamayo, When the “Coloreds” Are Neither Black nor Citizens:  The United States
Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration , 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 7-9 (1995); Frank H.
Wu, supra  note 20.
136 Chang, supra  note 20, at 1267.
137 Lazos Vargas, White Immigrant Narrative , supra  note 126.
138 Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3.
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California’s redistricting battle, which subtly alludes to APIAs as
a model minority:
I must commend you for the extraordinary job that CAPAFR
has done . . . there is no individual or organization that has
come forward with such an extraordinarily well done amount
of research and clear obvious efforts to reach out and work
out problems . . . I want to commend you for the extraordinary
effort. . . . Recognizing that lawyers will see different things,
it’s obvious you’ve done some extraordinary work. . . . We
greatly appreciate the work you’ve done.139
CAPAFR might well have done extraordinary work in its polit-
ical redistricting efforts.  I am not disputing this.  What I find
striking about Longville’s well-meaning statement is that in a
100-word compliment, Longville used the term “extraordinary”
four times and “job,” “work,” or “effort” seven times.  His choice
of words conveys that CAPAFR and APIAs are extraordinarily
hard workers who are conciliatory, not confrontative.  These
terms recall Asian American stereotypes that have in other con-
versations positioned them as a model minority.
Essentializing Asian Americans as helpful, hardworking, and
consensus driven is a form of racial positioning.  What this com-
plimentary stereotyping leaves unsaid is that Asian Americans
are more like Whites because of essentialized qualities, for
Longville, “extraordinar[il]y” well-prepared and hard working,
and for Barone, “high talent.”  The unstated comparison might
be to African Americans, whose essentialized oppositional quali-
ties in this context might be lazy and overly confrontative.  This
unstated comparison works only because “everyone knows” the
stereotypes that are ascribed to African Americans.  Hence, es-
sentializing and over-complimentary rhetoric does the work of
whitening Asian Americans.  Placing Asian Americans as a
group close to Whites, however, does not necessarily mean that
they are beyond or outside of the Black-White paradigm, only
that by placing them in proximity to White values and the meta-
White ethnic narrative of hard work and success, African Ameri-
cans and other groups are less worthy (i.e., unable to succeed by
the rules that apply to all and that Asian Americans have been
able to do well by playing by the rules).140
139 Id . at n.166 (quoting Feng and Ichinose).
140 See  Lazos Vargas, White Immigrant Narrative , supra  note 126, at 1539-43 (dis-
cussing use of ethnic narrative in constructing white racial innocence); Ikemoto,
supra  note 135 (discussing racial positioning).
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In sum, no context can escape conscious and unconscious race
talk.  The electoral context is no exception.  These critiques point
to the hard work that LatCrit faces in forming a rigorous scholar-
ship around voting rights and electoral politics.  Building a theo-
retical framework that moves beyond the Black-White
paradigm141 in the context of electoral process and voting rights
might entail the following.
1. Reconstructing Jim Crow .  As the civil rights era increasingly
becomes a distant memory to young Americans, it becomes in-
creasingly important for LatCrit scholars to document the Jim
Crow practices against Latinas/os and APIAs in the electoral
context.142  As Juan Perea, Angela Harris, Richard Delgado, and
Stephanie Wildman suggest in their Race and Races  textbook,143
documenting historical racist practices is a necessary project in
order to find out just what is “looking to the bottom.”  The
Black-White paradigm erases Jim Crow practices against Latinas/
os and APIAs.144  However, historical research re-establishes his-
torical and structural racism against Latinas/os and APIAs.
2. Deconstructing the Model Minority Myth.  The ephemeral
potential power of the Latina/o and APIA electorate has become
a new political wisdom that is working mischief at various levels.
From a racial analysis perspective, LatCrit must engage in the
same activism that APIA crit colleagues, Bob Chang, Lisa
Ikemoto, Frank Wu, Pat Chew, and Neil Gotanda have engaged
in:  publicly and vigorously critiquing the model minority myth as
applied to APIAs in the affirmative action context.145  Such rhet-
oric legitimizes and redeploys (thus re-legitimizing for modern
141 See also  Carbado, supra  note 20, at 1310-11 (suggesting possible avenues for
the continuing development of the critique of the Black-White paradigm).
142 Professors de la Garza and DeSipio note that the legislative history for the
Voting Rights Act amendments consist of anecdotal testimony of Jim Crow practices
suffered by Mexican Americans in Texas, and does not go beyond that.  De la Garza
& DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1492-93.  Chicano and LatCrit scholarship have docu-
mented Jim Crow practices against Mexican Americans in Texas. See , e.g. , David
Montejano, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 (1987)
(documenting social, political, and de jure  White Supremacist practices); Jose Ro-
berto Juarez, Jr., The American Traditions of Language Rights:  The Forgotten Right
to Government in a “Known Tongue ,” 13 LAW & INEQ. 443 (1995) (documenting
how Tejanos’ language rights were undermined in Anglo controlled Texas).
143 See  JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES:  CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA (2000).
144 See  Chew, supra  note 125.
145 See  sources cited supra  notes 111-12.
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ears) White supremacist narratives.  Latinas/os are not accus-
tomed to being treated as a model minority.  However, public
commentary on the potential  Latina/o electorate needs to be de-
bunked as part of the LatCrit project.
From a civil rights perspective, the small victories gained by
Latina/o and APIA political activism are being turned into
“proof” that civil rights remedies for Latinas/os and APIAs are
no longer pressing or necessary.146  The recent Voting Rights Act
case, Cano v. Davis ,147 denied relief to the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s (MALDEF) claim that
the new California districting plan underrepresented Latinas/
os.148  The court was persuaded that the requirements of the Vot-
ing Rights Act were not met because there has been increased
representation of Latinas/os in California.149  The court also
found that the new districts were “remarkably diverse multi-ra-
cial and multi-ethnic.”150
The court seemed to view the small gains in Latina/o represen-
tation as evidence that further remedies under civil rights laws
were not warranted.  The court never referred to the higher (and
more ephemeral) standard of Reynolds v. Sims ,151 whether La-
tinas/os were “meaningful[ly] represent[ed].”  As Johnson, Feng,
Aoki, and Ikegami note, Cano v. Davis  raises important and
pressing issues to which LatCrit scholarship must respond.152
3. What’s in a name?  Pan-racial identities like Latina/o and
APIA are a necessary shorthand that rhetorically concentrates
claims for civil rights activism,153 but nevertheless obscure the ex-
tent to which each individual group is “raced” or subordinated in
the context of voting rights issues.  A central tenet in LatCrit ra-
cial theory is its commitment to anti-essentialism.  Fully explor-
146 See  discussion by Johnson, supra  note 4; Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3.
147 211 F.Supp.2d 1208 (2002).
148 Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund challenged two dis-
tricts, Congressional District 28, located in the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles
County, and State Senate District 27, comprised of Southeast Los Angeles County
and Long Beach. See  discussion by Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, & Part III
infra ; Johnson, Latina/os and the Political Process, supra  note 4.
149 211 F.Supp.2d at 1235 (“SD 27 is a district in which Latino candidates and
other candidates preferred by Latino voters can win. . . . [A]n exercise of negative
voting power by the white majority . . . is wholly absent here.”).
150 Id.  at 1230 (finding that a Shaw v. Reno  claim could not be met).
151 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
152 See  discussion by Johnson, supra  note 4; Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3.
153 See generally  Iijima, supra  note 20.
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ing how class, gender, sexual orientation, and race interweave
and cross-construct racialization has been a key tool to balance
the essentialist tendencies.
From a civil rights perspective, lumping various Latina/o and
APIA subgroups into the pan-racial identity obscures valid civil
rights claims.  For example, in South Florida, Central Americans
and Puerto Ricans have managed to elect only one representa-
tive to the state legislature.  Until this year, Latina/o representa-
tion in Florida was all Cuban American.154  Yet it cannot be
assumed that one Latina/o national origin group will have an
identity of interests with another.  An overwhelming majority of
Latinas/os (eighty-three percent) report that Latino-on-Latino
discrimination occurs based on country of origin.155  As Dean
Kevin Johnson notes, a key area of scholarly inquiry should be
whether Latinas/os and APIAs of different origin should be clas-
sified as monolithic for purposes of Voting Rights remedies and
Equal Protection claims.156
II
JOINING ANTI-SUBORDINATION THEORY AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS AGENDA:  EXCLUSION FROM
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The denial of the vote in national elections to an estimated
seventeen to twenty-two million Latinas/os and APIAs residing
in this country is a key civil rights and anti-subordination issue.157
There is no exact number of how many Latinas/os and APIAs
who cannot vote but yet are long-term settled residents and citi-
zens of the United States.  This is because the U.S. Census Bu-
reau has consistently undercounted minorities and also has been
unable to come up with an exact count of undocumented work-
ers.  Nevertheless, estimates have shown consistently that the
number of Latinas/os and APIAs who are settled in the United
States and view the United States as their home158 is far higher
154 See  Padilla, supra  note 71.
155 2002 Pew Latina/o Survey , supra  note 105, at Chart 4.2.  91% of Central
Americans, 96% of Colombians, 93% of Salvadorans, and 87% of Dominicans be-
lieved that Latinas/os discriminating against other Latinas/os was a problem.  Three-
quarters attributed discrimination to class and country of origin differences. Id . at
T.4.6.
156 See  discussion by Johnson, supra  note 4.
157 Id . at 12. See also  Johnson, supra  note 17, at 1218-24.
158 Cf . Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)
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than the number who actually vote in elections.159
The first component of the estimate are the thirteen to eigh-
teen million Latinas/os and APIAs who cannot vote because they
are foreign born and have not become U.S. citizens.  Census data
is not broken out for these categories.  However, census data do
reflect the proportion of Latinas/os (12.8 million or 39% of total)
and APIAs (6.7 million or 61% of total) who are foreign born.160
Of the total 33 million Latinas/os who reside in this country,161
between 29% (Census)162 and 42% (Pew estimate)163 are nonci-
tizens, equalling between 9.5 and 14 million Latinas/os.  Among
the 10.9 million APIAs, the percentage of foreign born nonci-
tizens is 33% (Census),164 or over 3.5 million.  Noncitizens can-
not vote since no state grants them the right of suffrage in state
and national elections.165
The second component of this number are the four million La-
tina/o U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico,166 and the APIA
citizens who reside in American Samoa,167 Guam,168 and North-
(nullifying efforts by Census Bureau to eliminate undercount by implementing sta-
tistical sampling).
159 See  de la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26, at 1511-13 (finding that this rela-
tionship held all during the 1980s and 1990s); Citrin & Highton, supra  note 51 (re-
porting that in California due to noncitizenship of Latinas/os “whites would
comprise about 35% of voting-age adults in 2040, but 53% of voters. . . . Latinos
would comprise more than 40% of voting-age adults, but only 26% of the
electorate.”).
160 See supra  note 72; Census of Foreign Born, supra  note 74, at 24.
161 Census of Foreign Born , supra  note 74, at T.9-1 (not including Puerto Rico).
162 According to Census data, 39.0% of Latinas/os are foreign born, of which
74.3% are noncitizens, equalling 29.0% of the total Latina/o population who are
foreign born, noncitizens. Id.  at 24, T.9-1 & Fig. 9.2. See also supra  note 72.
163 According to Pew Hispanic Trust data, forty-two percent of polled Latinas/os
are noncitizens who cannot vote. See Latino Electorate , supra  note 63, at Chart 4.
The difference between the Census and Pew data is accounted for by different meth-
odologies.  The Census data is based on a complete decennial census that has rou-
tinely undercounted minorities and undocumented.  The Pew data is based on
telephone surveys.
164 According to Census data, 61.5% of APIAs are foreign born, and of these
54.3% are noncitizens, that is, 33.4% of total APIAs are foreign born, noncitizens.
Census of Foreign Born , supra  note 74, at 24, Fig. 9-2. See also supra  note 22.
165 See infra  notes 160-64.
166 See  U.S. Census Bureau, Population Div., PR-99-1 Estimates of the Population
of Puerto Rico Municipios , July 1, 2000, available at  http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www/estimates/puerto-rico.html>.  Of the 3,808,610 persons who reside in Pu-
erto Rico, 98.8% or 3,762,746 were Latina/o. See  U.S. Census Bureau, Census Data
for Puerto Rico, at T.DP-1. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics:  2000,
Puerto Rico .
167 In Guam there are 154,805 persons residing, of which 126,861 are U.S. citizens.
About 90%, or 113,000 report being APIA. See  U.S. Census Bureau, Population
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ern Marianna Islands.169  As the result of these areas’ legal status
as unincorporated territories,170 U.S. citizens who reside there
cannot vote in national elections.
This is not the sum total of persons of color in the United
States who are disenfranchised because of various legal barriers.
Most notably, about 600,000 residents of Washington, D.C., of
which around 70%, or about 400,000, are African Americans and
Latina/o,171 have no representation in national elections.  In Ad-
ams v. Clinton ,172 the district court concluded that only state citi-
zens are accorded the right to representation in Congress and the
right to vote for the President.173  In addition, in most states
felons cannot vote.  Current estimates are that close to four mil-
lion persons cannot vote because of felony convictions, which
often include minor offenses like smoking marijuana, shoplifting,
or passing bad checks; one-third of these disenfranchised voters
are African American.174
A. Political Exclusion of Noncitizens
Latinas/os and APIAs work in, reside in, and contribute to the
economy and welfare of this country.  Their contributions fuel
and Housing Profile:  2000 Guam , available at  www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
2002/Guamfullprofile.xls
168 In the Northern Mariana Islands there are 69,221 persons residing of which
68,774 are U.S. citizens; 97% report being APIA, or about 66,000.  U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Population and Housing Profile:  2000, The Commonwealth of Northern Mari-
ana Islands , available at  www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/cnmifull
profile.xls.
169 See infra  note 177 and accompanying text.
170 There are 57,291 persons residing in American Samoa, and 37,040 are U.S.
citizens.  96% of all American Samoa residents report being APIA.  Accordingly,
approximately 35,000 APIA U.S. citizens were denied a vote because they resided in
American Samoa. See  U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Profile:  2000
American Samoa , available at  www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2000/amsam
statelevel.pdf.
171 See  U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary , Profile of General Demo-
graphic Characteristics:  2000, at T.DP-1, available at  http://factfinder.census.gov/
servlet/QTTable?ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&geo_id=04000US11&qr_name=
DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1.  The census reports 572,059 persons living in Washington
D.C., 61.3% or 350,455 are African American and 7.9% or 44,953 are Latina/o, for
an approximate 70%.
172 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. D.C. 2000) (per curiam), judgment aff’d , Alexander v.
Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000) (concluding that while D.C. residents may be federal
citizens, federal citizenship does not accord them any right to representation in
Congress).
173 Id.  at 55-56.
174 Developments in the Law:  One Person No Vote , 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1940
(2002).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 35  7-OCT-03 8:40
The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000 817
the economic engines of the most important states like Califor-
nia, Florida, and New York, where the percentage of foreign
born is 26%, 18%, and 20%, respectively.175  Associate Dean
Chris Cameron has described how important the undocumented
are to the economy of Southern California.176  A recent study
commissioned by the Business Round Table concludes that immi-
grant labor force accounts for eight of ten new male workers en-
tering the American labor force, and fifteen percent of the
American labor force in the decade of 1990 to 2000.177  Without
foreign born workers the U.S. economy would have faltered, and
become stagnated during the boom 1990s.178  Some of these new
workers are documented; however, estimates show that between
eight to ten million are undocumented immigrants.179
Foreign immigration is geographically skewed.  In California,
one in four residents are foreign born; in New York, one in
five.180  In the Northeast, had it not been for immigration, indus-
tries would not have been able to fill the jobs fueled by economic
growth.181
The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee U.S. citizens the
right to vote, neither does it bar noncitizens from voting.  In
Reynolds v. Sims , Chief Justice Warren emphasized that it was
“state legislatures [that] are, historically, the fountainhead of rep-
175 Census of Foreign Born , supra  note 74, at 14.
176 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity:  Why the Fu-
ture of the American Labor Movement Depends on Latino Workers , 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1089, 1098-1103 (1999).
177 Andrew Sum et al., Immigrant Workers and the Great American Job Machine:
The Contributions of New Foreign Immigration to National and Regional Labor
Force Growth in the 1990s , Business Roundtable (Dec. 2002) at T.1 available at
http://www.brtable.org/document.cfm/781 [hereinafter Business Roundtable Study].
178 Id .
179 According to the Bureau of the Census, the number of foreign born who are
unauthorized according to their immigration status is 8,835,450.  This estimate is part
of a technical report reconciling the data gathered in the 2000 Census and Census
estimation methods for the population of the United States prior to the 2000 decen-
nial census. See  J. Gregory Robinson, Bureau of the Census, ESCAP II, Demo-
graphic Analysis Results , at T.3-5 (2001).  The Pew Foundation and the Urban
Institute put the number of undocumented workers at close to eight million.  Frank
D. Bean, Jennifer Van Hook & Karen Woodrow-Lafield, The Pew Hispanic Center,
Estimates of Numbers of Unauthorized Migrants Residing in the United States:  The
Total, Mexican, and Non-Mexican Central American Unauthorized Populations in
Mid-2001  (Nov. 2001); B. Lindsay Lowell & Roberto Suro, The Pew Hispanic
Center, How Many Undocumented:  The Numbers Behind the U.S.-Mexico Migra-
tion Talks  (Mar. 21, 2002).
180 Census of Foreign Born , supra  note 74 at 14.
181 Business Roundtable Study , supra  note 177.
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resentative government in this country.”182  In Skafte v. Rorex ,183
the Court rejected a claim that denial of the franchise to nonci-
tizens violates the Equal Protection guarantee.
The choice to bar noncitizens from voting has been made by
states.  In 2003, no state permits noncitizens to vote in national or
state elections; however, a handful of jurisdictions allow nonci-
tizens to vote in local elections.184  Scholarly work has docu-
mented that this has not always been the case.  At the turn of the
century, Midwestern states like Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, and
Nebraska granted (male) noncitizen settlers the right to vote.185
The argument for the noncitizen vote is based on liberal and
communitarian principles.  Those who contribute to the polity
and live within and form part of local communities should be
treated as members of that community.  Noncitizens who live and
work in U.S. communities are subject to the U.S. sovereign’s au-
thority.  They contribute to the government by paying taxes
(sales tax, property tax, and often social security tax).  The right
to self-determination, which informs the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, dictates that those who are subject to U.S. sovereign au-
thority should have a voice in determining their government
through the election of their representatives.  The exclusion of up
to thirteen million noncitizen Latinas/os and APIAs from having
a voice in representative government has little justification in lib-
eral theory or in natural rights principles.186  Rather, exclusion is
how historically the legal system has perpetuated status inequal-
ity and subordination.187
182 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
183 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976).
184 Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens:  The Historical, Constitutional
and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage , 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1461-63
(1993).  Raskin documents that New York City grants noncitizens who are the par-
ents of school children the right to vote and run for community school board, see
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), as does Chicago, see ILL.
ANN. STAT. § 122, ¶ 34-2.1(d)(ii) (1999).  Various jurisdictions in Maryland, such as
Takoma Park, Chevy Chase, Somerset, Barnesville, and Martin’s Additions extend
the franchise in all local elections to residents who are not U.S. citizens.
185 See  Raskin, supra  note 184, at 1417-41; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162
(1874).
186 Accord  Gerald L. Neuman, “We Are the People”:  Alien Suffrage in German
and American Perspective,  13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 291-310; T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 187 (2002).
187 The documentation of this statement is one way to sum up the whole of Criti-
cal Race and LatCrit scholarship; in the context of noncitizens, see  especially John-
son, supra  note 17.  Liberal scholars, however, have also made this their life work.
See , e.g. , JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:  THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
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In a well-reasoned student note, April Chung has argued that
the ongoing exclusion from the political sphere of so many nonci-
tizen, local community members who work, reside, and contrib-
ute, distorts the political process and makes it unfair.188  The self-
interested impulse of current electorates is to preserve their
power by fighting off expansion to the disenfranchised because
this means dilution of their own vote.189  As April Chung ex-
plains, “[b]ecause noncitizens cannot vote, citizens’ votes propor-
tionately increase in value.  Citizens then have greater power [by
denying noncitizens any participation in the electoral process] to
shift societal or economic burdens onto noncitizens.”190  Profes-
sor de la Garza argues as well that granting immigrants the right
to vote would empower their communities and encourage greater
connection to American society.191  Professor Alex Aleinikoff
has argued that liberal principles militate for settled immigrants
being able to vote, at the very least in local elections, to enhance
local communities.192  Professor Klarman would have courts po-
lice self-interested majoritarian actions when they entrench pre-
sent majorities and do not reflect the changes in the current
polis.193
Associate Dean Kevin Johnson194 and Professor Klarman195
have also argued that judicial intervention on behalf of disen-
37-38 (1991) (explaining how Americans have historically used the exclusion from
citizenship and the right to vote as a way of perpetuating racist, religious bigotry and
sexist policies).
188 April Chung, Noncitizen Voting Rights and Alternatives:  A Path Toward
Greater Asian Pacific American and Latino Political Participation , 4 ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 163, 174 (1996).
189 Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Prob-
lem,  85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).  “The current electoral majority in a particular political
community plainly possesses some incentive to resist expanding participation in
ways that might threaten its majority status . . .” Id.  at 517.  “[T]he current majority
has a self-interested motive to perpetuate the status quo.” Id.  at 519.
190 Chung, supra  note 188, at 175.
191 LOUIS DESIPIO & RODOLFO O. DE LA GARZA, MAKING AMERICANS, REMAK-
ING AMERICA: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 96-98 (1998).
192 ALEINIKOFF, supra  note 186, at 187.
193 Klarman, supra  note 189, at 519 (“Since there is no right answer to the ques-
tion of which majority is entitled to define the scope of the political community, and
the present majority has self-interested reasons to resist expansion, anti-entrench-
ment theory counsels vesting decision making authority elsewhere.”).  Other schol-
ars have championed a similar market-based rationale to judicial scrutiny of the
electoral process. See  Samuel Issachacoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process , 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
194 See  Johnson, supra  note 17, at 1218-24.
195 Klarman, supra  note 189, at 520.
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franchized noncitizens is justified based on the legal process ra-
tionale presented in United States v. Carolene Products Co.196
Noncitizens are the classic case of a discrete and insular group
because they do not have a political voice and yet are the target
of legislative actions that subordinate their status or shift to them
the costs of social programs enjoyed by citizens.
As Kevin Johnson notes, the theoretical arguments have re-
mained just that, theoretical,197 rather than prevailing through
the inherent logic of American democratic principles, as Profes-
sor Shklar predicted more optimistically (and perhaps with a
much longer time frame in mind).198  Arbitrary legal construc-
tions of citizenship have legitimized these exclusions and obfus-
cated that the judgments as to who has a political voice are in
part made on race, gender, and class stratifications.  This has led
to the current state of affairs, that among Latinas/os, three in
eight,199 and among APIAs, one in three, are silenced
electorally.200  This is an astoundingly high proportion and a ma-
jor component of the Latina/o and APIA community in the
United States.
B. Puerto Rico:  One Hundred Years of Standing
Outside the Looking Glass
Under the legal doctrine constructing the citizenship of Puerto
Rico in the Insular Cases  in the early 1900s,201 Puerto Rican U.S.
196 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (justifying heightened scrutiny where
statutes [are] directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial
minorities . . .; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry).
197 See  Johnson, supra  note 17, at 1222.
198 See SHKLAR, supra  note 187, at 38 (concluding hopefully that “after long and
painful struggles the inherent political logic of American representative democracy,
based on political equality, did prevail.”).
199 Of the total 36.8 million Latinas/os who reside in the United States (including
Puerto Rico) between 13.5 and 18 million cannot vote because they are noncitizens,
see supra  notes 147-49 and accompanying text, and because they live in Puerto Rico,
see supra  note 152.
200 Of the total, 11.1 million APIAs who reside in the United States and its terri-
tories, about 3.7 million cannot vote because they are noncitizens, see supra  note 148
and accompanying text, and they live in territories, see supra  note 164.
201 Balzac v. Porto Rico , 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States , 234 U.S.
91 (1914); Dorr v. United States,  195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi , 190 U.S.
197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell , 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley v. United States , 182
U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell , 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
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citizens cannot participate in the American democratic polity,
but nonetheless are subject to U.S. sovereignty.  As Judge Tor-
ruella explained in his concurrence to Igartua De La Rosa v.
United States :
This anomalous situation arises primarily as a result of the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases , which es-
tablished as early as 1901 the plenary power of Congress over
Puerto Rico under the so-called “territorial” clause of the
Constitution.  In a series of narrowly divided decisions, the
Court held that Puerto Rico was an “unincorporated terri-
tory,” . . . and as a result part of the United States for some
purposes and not for others. . . . [I]n Balzac v. Porto Rico , [the
Supreme Court] established the inferior nature of the United
States citizenship held by residents of Puerto Rico by conclud-
ing that the Constitution’s protection of these new citizens was
limited to those rights deemed by the Court to be
“fundamental.”202
Under this line of cases, a Puerto Rican citizen cannot re-
nounce her U.S. citizenship,203 yet her U.S. citizenship gives her
no say in national elections.204  This doctrine has survived for
more than one hundred years.205  Congress has at various times
under both Republican and Democratic administrations consid-
ered Puerto Rico’s status, but the results have always been a
stalemate.  There are structural reasons for this.  The theory of
202 229 F.3d 80, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J., concurring) (Igartua II) (cita-
tion omitted).
203 Ramı´rez de Ferrer v. Mari Bra´s , 97 JTS 128, 143 PR Dec. ___ (1997).
204 Igartua De La Rosa v. United States , 842 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D. P.R.), aff’d , 32
F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[G]ranting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico the right to
vote in presidential elections would require either that Puerto Rico become a state,
or [the adoption of] a constitutional amendment. . . .”); Igartua De La Rosa v. United
States , 229 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2000) (citizens residing in Puerto Rico do not have a
right to vote in presidential elections because Puerto Rico “is not entitled under
Article II to choose electors for the President.”).
205 See generally  JOSE´ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE:
NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PU-
ERTO RICANS 7 (Yale University Press 1979) (1978); JOSE´ TRI´AS MONGE, PUERTO
RICO:  THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 3 (1997); JUAN R.
TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO:  THE DOCTRINE OF SEPA-
RATE AND UNEQUAL (1985); Jose´ A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico:  Colonialism as Consti-
tutional Doctrine , 100 HARV. L. REV. 450, 455 (1986) (book review); Pedro A.
Malavet, Puerto Rico:  Cultural Nation, American Colony , 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(2000); Efre´n Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:  The
Insular Cases (1901-1922) , 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996); Ediberto Roman, The
Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism,  26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1 (1998); Ediberto Roma´n, Empire Forgotten:  The United States’s Coloniza-
tion of Puerto Rico , 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1997).
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entrenchment,206 for example, explains why Republicans have
put up opposition, most often cast in the form of cultural argu-
ments (i.e., “but Puerto Ricans speak Spanish, not English”).
Republicans have tended to view Puerto Rico as a likely Demo-
cratic state, because Puerto Ricans in mainland elections have
voted mostly Democratic.207  If mainland political behavior were
to hold true on the Island (this is not necessarily the case), Pu-
erto Rico would have two Democratic Senators and would have
voted Democratic in the Presidential elections, which means that
the current Republican sweep would not have taken place.  As
well, process theory explains inaction.  Puerto Ricans have no
vote in Congress.  Their interests are not represented in the give
and take of political dealmaking.  They therefore have been ig-
nored in “one hundred years of solitude.”208
Igartua II  challenged the electoral status quo in the 2000 elec-
tions based on constitutional grounds.209  The plaintiffs and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as intervenor, lost their constitu-
tional arguments.210  The concurring opinion, however, elicited
from Judge Torruella, who was born in Puerto Rico and is a
scholar of Puerto Rico’s territorial relationship with the United
States, set forth an eloquent argument as to why this electoral
lack of voice demands redress:
In this 211th year of the United States Constitution, and
102nd year of United States presence in Puerto Rico, United
States citizenship must mean more than merely the freedom to
travel to and from the United States.  [Federal] citizenship
should not, cannot, be devalued to such a low scale. . . . The
national disenfranchisement of these citizens ensures that they
will never be able, through the political processes, to rectify
the denial of their civil rights in those very political processes.
This uninterrupted condition clearly provides solid basis for
206 See supra  note 174 and accompanying text.
207 See supra  note 89.
208 GABRIEL GARCI´A MA´RQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE (Gregory
Rabarra trans., 1970).
209 229 F.3d at 81.  The plaintiffs argued that denial of the vote violated constitu-
tional privileges and immunities due process, and the equal protection guarantee.  A
similar challenge was staged in Igartua De La Rosa v. United States , 32 F.3d 8 (1st
Cir. 1994) (Igartua I) (challenge to exclusion of Puerto Rico U.S. citizens in national
elections was denied based on statutory interpretation of the Uniformed and Over-
seas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and the court’s reading of Article II of the Con-
stitution, providing that the President shall be elected by electors from states).
210 The per curiam opinion held that the controversy had already been decided in
Igartua I . Iguartua II , 229 F.3d at 83-84.
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judicial intervention at some point, one for which there is re-
sounding precedent. See Brown v. Board of Education . . . .
The perpetuation of this colonial condition runs against the
very principles upon which this Nation was founded. Indefi-
nite  colonial rule by the United States is not something that
was contemplated by the Founding Fathers nor authorized211
. . . [I]t is  time to serve notice upon the political branches of
government that it is incumbent upon them, in the first in-
stance, to take appropriate steps to correct what amounts to
an outrageous disregard for the rights of a substantial segment
of its citizenry.212
Unfortunately, at this time Judge Torruella is clearly a minority
voice on the federal bench.
C. Moving Beyond the Black-White Paradigm
In the context of exclusion of around twenty million Latinas/os
and APIAs from the electoral process, moving beyond the Black-
White paradigm means raising consciousness.  First, LatCrit
scholarship should continue to document the legalisms and racial
history that give rise to such extensive exclusion.  Second, Lat-
Crit work should humanize the silencing of so many voices.
1. A “Non-starter” Conversation or a Scholarly Agenda?
It is extremely important to both the LatCrit anti-subordina-
tion project and its activist agenda to make the electoral exclu-
sion of millions of Latinas/os and APIAs part of an active
conversation within LatCrit and the legal community that Lat-
Crit inhabits.  No single action would politically empower La-
tinas/os and APIAs more.
Professor Sanford Levinson has written that academic consti-
tutional theorists skirt important structural issues that are viewed
as “hard-wired,” because academics do not believe it is worth
their time to make arguments that they believe will not eventu-
ally win out in courts.213  As Levinson himself recognizes, ignor-
ing “hard-wired” constitutional features is at “our peril,” and
“risk[s] . . . betrayal of the very principles that we like to say that
the Constitution espouses.”214  The lack of electoral voice by
noncitizens and Puerto Rico’s political exclusion as an “unincor-
211 Id.  at 89.
212 Id.  at 90 (citation omitted).
213 See  Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution:  A Tentative
List of Some Early Lessons , 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 30 (2002).
214 Id .
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porated territory” are examples of “hard-wired” structural issues
that mainstream academics, with notable exceptions,215 have
ignored.
The anti-subordination mission of LatCrit places LatCrit schol-
ars at the center of discussing the “hard-wired” features that per-
petuate civil rights and political subordination of millions of
Latinas/os and APIAs.  Still, LatCrit scholarship has not fully
turned its attention to the issue of noncitizen exclusion, with the
notable exception of Kevin Johnson’s work.216  This focus is im-
portant simply because of the sheer size of the excluded popula-
tion—close to ten million as posited by this Article.  Latinas/os
and APIAs will remain a potential  electoral voice unless struc-
tural issues are addressed.  Judge Torruella and other LatCrit
theorists have written eloquently as to why the legal doctrine of
unincorporated territories, now over a century old and rooted in
outmoded ideas of conquest and possession of the non-civilized
by those who are “civilized,” should be repudiated.217  The con-
tributions to this Symposium by Pedro Malavet and Ediberto
Roman testify that LatCrit scholarship maintains focused on Pu-
erto Rico structural exclusion and racial constructions.218  As
well, as Pedro Malavet has encouraged, LatCrit conferences
should continue to focus on Puerto Rico as part of its conscious-
ness-raising and community building efforts.
2. Humanizing Exclusion
Associate Dean Kevin Johnson suggests that the route to polit-
ical empowerment of noncitizens lies in humanizing them.219
The term “illegal alien” makes it easy to demonize and make
them the “other.”  Johnson proposes that LatCrit scholars use
narratives to show how difficult the life of undocumented and
noncitizen workers are and yet show the common human predi-
caments that they share with the majority citizen population.220
215 See  sources cited supra  notes 166, 184. See also ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC
IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution? , 100 YALE L.J. 909, 959-60 (1991).
216 See  Johnson, supra  note 17.
217 See  sources cited supra  note 184.  For commentary of LatCrit scholarship in
this area, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit The-
ory:  The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-
1900 , 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 925 (2001).
218 See supra  note 2.
219 See  Johnson, supra  note 17, at 1223-25.
220 Id .  For excellent journalistic portrayals of the immigrant experience, see
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Elsewhere in this Symposium, I have suggested that organizing
conferences around the issue of rapid immigration into areas like
the Midwest and rural South, which are not accustomed to La-
tina/o settlements, is an important activist and scholarly tool that
humanizes the Latina/o immigrant, noncitizen, and undocu-
mented worker.221  Local conferences can become outreach and
community building loci for the very mission that Johnson pro-
poses.  Regardless of the method, the critical point is that Lat-
Crit’s consciousness-raising efforts must also involve community
building.222
III
LATINA/O AND APIA ELECTIONS IN 2002:  A GLASS
HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY?
The jury is still out as to whether the 2002 elections empow-
ered the Latina/o and APIA community or came up short of the
anticipated “Crouching Jaguar , Hidden Dragon”223 power that
minority merchants foretell.  This Part (1) sums up election re-
sults, (2) asks why progress has been so slow given redistricting
activism, (3) reviews the experiences in key electoral campaigns,
and (4) discusses minority voter turnout.  The last Part of this
section returns to the central question of this Article, what does
it mean, in the context of the electoral results post 2000, to move
beyond the Black-White paradigm.
A. Summing Up Election Results:  Is the glass half-full or
half-empty?  You be the judge.
1. The Glass is Half-Full
The 2002 elections saw important electoral gains for Latina/o
elected representatives.  Democrat Bill Richardson, a Mexican
American, was elected governor of New Mexico; the prior Latino
New Mexican governor had been elected two decades ago.  In
California, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamente was re-
elected.  Sylvia Garcia became the first Latina elected to serve on
RUBE´N MARTI´NEZ, CROSSING OVER:  A MEXICAN FAMILY ON THE MIGRANT TRAIL
(2001); JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE:  A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN
AMERICA (2000).
221 Lazos Vargas, “Latina/o-ization” of the Midwest , supra note 53, at 365-66.
222 See  Francisco Valdes, Under Construction:  LatCrit Consciousness, Commu-
nity, and Theory , 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093-95 (1997) (foreword).
223 See supra  Part I.B.1.
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the Commissioner’s Court in Harris County (Houston), Texas.
Christine Baca became the first Latina elected to the Colorado
State Board of Education.224  In Oregon, LatCrit keynote
speaker Susan Castillo became Oregon’s first Latina Superinten-
dent of Schools.225  In Nevada, Republican Brian Sandoval was
elected state Attorney General.226
At a national level, representation in the U.S. Congress in-
creased by four more representatives.  There are now twenty-two
Latinas/os in the House of Representatives.  No additional APIA
representative was elected to either the House or Senate, so
APIA representatives in the House remains at four.227  One ad-
ditional African American was elected to the House of Repre-
sentatives, for a total of thirty-seven.228
2. The Glass is Half-Empty
The 2002 elections for national office followed the historical
pattern that a minority candidate cannot get elected to Congress
unless the district in which she is competing is at least a majority
minority.229  In the four 2002 races where Latinas/os were elected
to the House of Representatives, the district was a majority La-
224 Press Release, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Offi-
cials Educational Fund, Latinos Capture Key Elected Offices, at  http://www.naleo.
org/press_releases/latino_capture_key_elected_offices.pdf (Nov. 6, 2002); Hispanics
Celebrate an Impressive 2002 Election Performance , PUERTO RICO HERALD, at
http://www.puertorico_herald.org/issues/2002/vol6n45/GraphicHead-en.shtm (Nov.
8, 2002).
225 Ana Radelat, Breaking New Barriers , HISP. MAG., Oct. 2002, at 16-18, availa-
ble at  http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2002/oct/Features/sanchez.html.
226 Ken Ellingwood, Throughout the Country, Latinos See Their Clout Build in
Political Arena , L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at A30.
227 This count does not include the non-voting representatives of Guam, Ameri-
can Samoa, and Northern Mariana Islands who do not vote.  Also excluded is Rep.
Patsy Mink, who was reelected although she died before the November elections.
The four APIA officials elected to the House of Representatives are Rep. Robert
Matsui (D-CA), Rep. Michael Honda (D-CA), Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA), and Rep.
David Wu (D-OR). Rodney Jay C. Salinas, On the Ballot:  2002 Mid-Term Election
Results for Asian Pacific American Candidates , at  http://www.rainmaker politi-
cal.com/index.html (last visited July 1, 2003).
228 Clerk of the House of Representatives, Statistics of the Congressional Election
of November 5, 2002 , available at  http://clerk.house.gov/members/election_informa
tion/2002/2002Stat.htm [hereinafter Statistics of Election].
229 Professor David Lublin has calculated that the magical threshhold required to
elect an African American representative from a large district is fifty-five percent
African American. LUBLIN, supra  note 112, at 45-54, 133.  As Lublin notes, this
threshhold does not always hold and depends on the politics and culture of each
district, and for Latinas/os and APIAs in particular, the percentage in the district
who are citizens and therefore eligible to vote. Id.  at 51-52.
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tina/o district.  In California, the Democratic-controlled state leg-
islature created a Latina/o majority 39th district that elected
Linda Sanchez, and in a very close election, elected Dennis Car-
doza in the 18th District to the House of Representatives.230  In
Florida, the Republican-controlled state legislature carved out a
seat that went to Mario Diaz-Balart, a Cuban American Republi-
can from south Florida.231  Arizona created the 7th District seat
that handily elected Democrat Raul Grijalva to the House.232
In California, where Latinas/os and APIAs together make up
the majority population, their representation in state and local
government remains marginal although great improvements have
been made.233  Only five APIAs have seats in the California state
legislature.234  In Los Angeles, one Latina/o gained a seat to the
City Assembly, but only after Voting Rights Act litigation waged
by MALDEF precipitated restructuring of the representational
scheme.235  As Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami note, some APIA com-
munities, like Los Angeles’ Koreatown, have been divided for
generations and their state and national representation have
been fragmented.236
The demographic explosion of Latinas/os and APIAs has not
translated into greater representation by Latina/o and APIA
elected representatives at the national level.  The 2002 gains in
elected representatives were small given the forty-eight percent
and fifty-eight percent growth of Latinas/os and APIAs, respec-
tively, since the last decennial redistricting.237  According to a re-
cent study compiled by Kim Geron and James Lai, the total
number of Latina/o and APIA elected officials, at all levels of
government stands at one percent of the nation’s 513,200 elected
officials.238
230 Statistics of Election , supra  note 228.
231 Id.
232 Billy House, Hispanic Inroads Fall Short of Predictions Arizona’s Grijalva is an
Exception , ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2002, at A19, available at  2002 WL 102843845.
233 In 1987, California had among the largest party deficits at .33—the difference
between proportion of population Latina/o and number of elected state representa-
tives—among states with high concentrations of Latinas/os, Arizona (.50), Colorado
(.65), New Mexico (1.01). HERO, supra  note 88, at 109.
234 See  discussion by Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3; see also infra  Part III.
235 See  discussion by Johnson, supra  note 4.
236 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 44.
237 See supra  note 21.
238 Geron & Lai, supra  note 57, at 48-49.  According to the figures in this Article,
in 2000, there were 309 APIA and 3,749 Latina/o elected officials out of a universe
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B. Why So Slow?:  Drawing District Lines
If fair representation of minority interests requires the election
of ethnic and racial representatives,239  then the 2002 elections
presage a grim future.
Latinas/os and APIAs were better organized than in previous
rounds, having gained experienced in litigating under the Voting
Rights Acts and having been involved in the political redistrict-
ing battles of 1990s.240  However, the net gain in electoral dis-
tricts where a Latina/o or APIA can be elected remains small.
While the Latina/o population grew by eighteen million since the
last decennial census, there were only four more elected Latina/o
representatives to Congress.  APIAs, which grew by four million,
did not increase their representation in Congress.241
The key to electing more minority representatives to Congress
(descriptive representation) lies in drawing district lines that will
favor minority candidates.242  The key instrument to getting this
done has been the Voting Rights Act.243
As Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami document, the Voting Rights Act
has eliminated barriers to voting, like poll taxes, monolingual
of 513,200 (compiled from the National Asian American Political Almanac and the
Toma´s Rivera Policy Institute, 1999 National Directory of Latino Elected Officials).
239 This is the model of minority representation adopted by Feng, Aoki, &
Ikegami. See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 892-93. But see  Johnson,
Latinas/os and the Political Process, supra  note 4 (raising question whether it is nec-
essary to elect Latina/os and APIAs for there to be minority representation in the
political process).
240 According to Professors de la Garza and DeSipio:
Between 1974 and 1984, there were 88 lawsuits filed in Texas by the Mexi-
can American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF).  Groups
such as MALDEF, the Southwest Voter Registration Project, the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Hispanic Coalition on
Reapportionment, among many others, lobbied and litigated to shape how
state representative and congressional district boundary lines were drawn,
which resulted in increased opportunities for Latinos to be elected to state
and federal offices in many states.
De la Garza & DeSipio, supra  note 26.
241 See supra  Part III.A.1.
242 This is the conclusion of Professor Lublin’s study, that minority candidates are
electable only in minority majority districts. See LUBLIN, supra  note 112.  But an
increase in descriptive representation has a negative impact on substantive
representaton.  More Republican conservatives will be electable once minorities are
concentrated in majority-minority districts. Id.  at 122-24. See supra  note 112 and
accompanying text.
243 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971-1974C (1994).  The Voting
Rights Act proscribes voting practices that result in the denial of a minority group’s
ability to elect its representative of choice.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973.
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ballots, and racial gerrymandering.  However, even though the
Voting Rights Act has been instrumental in carring out majority
minority districts, it still has not resulted in a significant increase
in the election of minority candidates.244  The Voting Rights Act
tests are difficult to meet and to show that a violation has oc-
curred where minority voter power exists has been diluted.  In-
creasingly, as the recent case of Cano v. Davis  discussed in Part
I.D. shows, the federal bench is applying logic about minority
group representation that will make it even more difficult for mi-
nority groups to obtain judicial relief.245  Finally the Shaw v.
Reno  doctrine nullifies districts that the court finds have been
drawn with primarily color-consciousness motivation.246
The redistricting process in state legislatures is full of political
and legal landmines.  The effort to draw districts that have
enough members of any one minority group to meet the thresh-
hold where they can directly elect a representative247 and exert
policy influence is tricky.248  Districting has to balance between
concentrating enough persons of a minority group so that it is
sufficiently minority and other political interests, like ensuring
that incumbants are re-elected or that Democrats/Republicans
continue to hold on to electoral power, plus avoid legal restric-
tions, mainly the Shaw v. Reno  prohibition against racial gerry
mandering.  Districting may set off an interracial and intergroup
conflict in which one minority group vies against the other to fur-
ther its claim to representation.249
In their Symposium contribution, Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami il-
lustrate the difficulty of this process in California.  They credit a
strong alliance with MALDEF and close work with state Repre-
sentative Judy Chu, for CAPAFR’s ability to preserve Assembly
District 49, which Ms. Chu represented.  They also credit state
Representative George Nakano’s membership in the Committee
for Elections and Reapportionment as key to their advocacy ef-
244 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 24-29.
245 See  discussion supra  notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
246 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 35-38.
247 See supra  note 226.
248 Professor Lublin finds that the influence threshhold for African Americans is
forty percent. See LUBLIN, supra  note 112, at 72.  Lublin does not arrive at an influ-
ence threshhold for Latinas/os, but does note how heavily threshhold numbers are
tied to the percent who are citizens in any given district. See id.  at 48-50. See also
note 226 and accompanying text.
249 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 24-28; de la Garza & DeSipio,
supra  note 26, at 925-26.
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forts.250  CAPAFR worked closely with the four APIA state rep-
resentatives.  This stands in sharp contrast to the sharp rebuke
suffered by MALDEF at the pen of Martha Escutia, who repre-
sented the 30th District and Gloria Romero, who represented the
24th District in the state senate.  In an editorial in the Los Ange-
les Times , Representatives Escutia and Romero accused
MALDEF of playing racial politics that were divisive, being sin-
gle-mindedly focused on race and not broader “American val-
ues” (presumably voting for the most qualified candidate
whether white, African American or Latina/o), sponsoring a plan
that undermined the districts of Latina/o representatives, and be-
ing single-mindedly focused on numbers rather than broader
coalitional justice-based goals.251  These Latina representatives
had reason to be irate, since in the redistricting process they
found themselves in districts where their runs for reelection
would be difficult.
At the same time that civil rights groups focused on increasing
minority representation must navigate the treacherous sea of mi-
nority politics, they also must fight the entrenched interests in
state houses.  It is increasingly clear that the primary goal in re-
districting is to ensure the continuing electability of incumbents,
whether White, Brown, Yellow, or Black.252  Such a system is
closed to change, whether it is to turn out entrenched, ineffective,
and self-interested representatives or to open up the electoral
system to increase minority representation.
C. Why So Slow?:  Campaigning in Racially
Polarized Environments
In The Tyranny of the Majority,  Lani Guinier observes:
Where voting is racially polarized those [minorities] who sup-
port the winning candidate enjoy minimal influence as a swing
vote.  [Minority] voters may help determine which candidate
gets elected, but the successful candidate must first be one
who started out with white support.  Moreover, once in office,
[minority] voters’ influence on that candidate’s performance is
250 Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 898 (“[T]he presence of Nakano and
the other APIA Assembly members proved vital in enhancing the strength and
voice of the APIA community.”).
251 Martha Escutia & Gloria Romero, MALDEF’s Lawsuit Is Racially Divisive ,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at M1. See  discussion by Johnson, supra  note 4.
252 See  discussion supra  notes 33-37 and accompanying text.  Bernard Grofman’s
study of California’s 1982 congressional plan found incumbant-centered partisan
bias of striking magnitude. See  Grofman, supra  note 32, at 157.
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questionable.  In a racially polarized environment, white offi-
cials are often unaware of [minority] voters’ decisive impact or
deliberately ignore it because of even more decisive white sup-
port.  As a consequence, it is hard to imagine a racially stigma-
tized minority, whatever its size, exercising genuine influence
in a racially polarized winner-take-all [election].253
According to Guinier’s theory, minority candidates will win so
long as they are able to keep race nonsalient during their cam-
paigns.  This is a difficult task because race is  salient by the very
fact that the candidate is a person of color.  As LatCrit keynote
speaker Susan Castillo notes, “We’re beginning to emerge on the
political scene, but we’re still the underdogs.”254  The 2002 elec-
tions bear this out.
1. The Glass is Half-Full:  Minority Candidates Win in
Non-Treaty of Guadalupe States
The good news in this electoral cycle was primarily in the state
races where various Latina/o candidates won statewide office
with White voter support.  The bad news is that Republican op-
ponents who had reason to worry about their candidacies were
easily able to racially polarize the electorate, and handily defeat
their minority challenges.
a. Victories in Non-Treaty of Guadalupe States
Nationwide, thirteen additional Latina/o state lawmakers were
elected in 2002, an increase to 217 of about 6500 state
lawmakers.255  Georgia elected three Latinos, Sam Zamarripa,
Pedro Marin, and David Casas to the state house of representa-
tives.  Maryland elected the first Latina/o lawmakers to the
House of Delegates, including Democrat Ana Sol Gutierrez from
Montgomery County who focused her campaign on getting out
the vote of Latino voters.256  Massachusetts elected former state
Representative Jarrett Barrios as that state’s first Latino state
senator, and Jeffrey Sanchez to the state house in a new state
legislative district that covers Jamaica Plain, Mission Hill, and
part of Brookline.257
253 GUINIER, supra  note 19, at 89.
254 Radelat, supra  note 225, at 17.
255 Ellingwood, supra  note 226.
256 Id .
257 Id .; Rodrı´guez, supra  note 94.
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b. Oregon:  A Predominantly White State Elects a Latina
In May 2002, LatCrit keynote speaker Susan Castillo became
Oregon’s new school superintendent, garnering fifty-five percent
of the vote and winning in nearly every Oregon county, with es-
pecially strong support in Eugene and Portland.258  Susan Cas-
tillo attributed her win to her positive message about public
schools, a well-thought program to revitalize school financing,
and image recognition due to her former career as a local televi-
sion reporter.259  Nonetheless, Castillo bucked strong odds.  Ore-
gon is only eight percent Latina/o.260  She was outspent by her
Republican opponent, $250,000 versus $175,000, a record in what
is purportedly a nonpartisan race.261  Finally, she had to neutral-
ize racist comments made by two conservative commentators on
a local radio program who questioned whether she could be a
U.S. citizen “with a name like Castillo.”262  The foreigner stereo-
type did not stick.  Instead, her hard work garnered the support
of school organizations, like the state teachers union, and the im-
age she had built as a reporter countered the racial stereotype.263
2. The Glass is Half-Empty:  Minority Candidates in Racially
Polarized Environments
By contrast to these positive results, in closely watched races in
Texas and California, Latina/o contestants lost big.  Minority civil
rights activists were hopeful that history would be made in two
races, the 2000 Los Angeles Mayoral race where long time politi-
cian, Antonio Villaraigosa, was running for mayor, and the 2002
Senate and gubenatorial Texas race where the Democratic slate
offered Tony Sanchez, a Latino businessman from El Paso, and
Ron Kirk, Dallas’ African American mayor, a candidacy posi-
tion.  In both contests the minority candidates lost because the
race became racially polarized.  Media campaigns were able to
link the minority candidates to racial stereotypes and stirred up
racial feelings among white voters.  When politics becomes ra-
cially polarized, minority candidates and issues almost always
258 Steven Carter, Castillo Avoids Runoff, Wins State Superintendent Post , ORE-
GONIAN (Portland), May 22, 2002, at E1; Radelat, supra  note 225, at 17.
259 Radelat, supra  note 225, at 17.
260 Id .
261 Carter, supra  note 258.
262 Radelat, supra  note 225, at 17.
263 Id .
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lose.264
a. The “Dream Team” Goes Down
In Texas, the dream team of Tony Sanchez and Ron Kirk was
trounced.  Sanchez, a blue-eyed, white-skinned, Latino business-
man from the border area spent $59 million on the campaign.265
He lost to Governor Rick Perry by the widest margin of any
Democratic candidate standing for statewide office, more than
800,000 votes for a seventeen point spread, fifty-eight percent to
forty percent.266  Ron Kirk fell to Republican John Cornyn, fifty-
five percent to forty-three percent, a twelve point difference.267
The (White) Republican sweep was so great that Texas Demo-
crats, for the first time in four decades, lost control of the Texas
House of Representatives.268  In the ashes of defeat, the kindest
commentary that could be mustered in favor of the “dream
team” was that it “was a good idea but just premature.”269
The margin of seventeen points by which Sanchez lost to Rick
Perry was a political trouncing.  Rick Perry was a lackluster can-
didate, someone who had never managed to come out of George
W. Bush’s shadow.  But Rick Perry played the race card.270
Perry managed to racially polarize Texas voters with hard hitting
ads that raised the stereotype that Sanchez’s fortune was gar-
nered through illegal activity.271  Perry’s ads featured the follow-
264 See KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?:  WHITE VOTERS, BLACK
CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing racial cues and
electoral backlash among the white electorate); JEFF MANZA & CLEM BROOKS, SO-
CIAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL CHANGE:  VOTER ALIGNMENTS AND U.S. PARTY
COALITIONS (1999) (discussing “subtle racism” in the white electorate); Smith, Race
and Money in Politics , supra  note 19, at 1486-88. See also  Lazos Vargas, Initiatives
& Minorities , supra  note 5 (using social science research to detail the conditions that
makes it likely that white voters will be influenced by anti-minority sentiments).
265 Associated Press, David Koenig, Democrats’ Multiethnic ‘Dream Team’ Falters




268 Clay Robison, Editorial, Battered Texas Dems Still Have a Role , HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 10, 2002, available at  2002 WL 23236797.
269 Koenig, supra  note 265 (quoting Cal Jillson, a political science professor at
Southern Methodist University).
270 By this I mean that Governor Perry used racial cuing—“the articulation of
racial meaning and identities in conflictual, albeit somewhat masked terms.”  Smith,
Race and Money in Politics , supra  note 19, at 1486.
271 Cf . Robison, supra  note 268 (“Racially polarized voting also was a factor in
the defeat of Kirk, an African-American, in the U.S. Senate race and of Sanchez, a
Hispanic, in the brawl for governor.”); Koenig, supra  note 265 (quoting Richard
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ing narrative:  “Tony Sanchez wants to run Texas like his
businesses.  But after Sanchez’s bank was used to launder drug
money, his bank failed.”272
This ad suggesting that Sanchez’s savings and loan laundered
money from Mexican drug lords ran repeatedly in the campaign’s
final days.273  Political analysts view the defection of fifteen per-
cent of Texas white Democrats, who might have been racially in-
fluenced by the drug dealer stereotype, to Perry as key to
Sanchez’s defeat.274
Ron Kirk, the Senate candidate, denies that race played a fac-
tor in his defeat, “Texas may not be ready to elect a black, but
this year America didn’t like any Democrats—didn’t like them
black, didn’t like them white . . . . We did not lose this race be-
cause of racism.”275  But race did play a role, in both the White
and Latina/o communities.  Whites predictably reacted nega-
tively to Sanchez when he was linked to the Latino criminal ster-
eotype,276 and Kirk’s linkage to Sanchez turned off the white
liberal support he had enjoyed in the past.  While Kirk managed
to pull more white Democrats than Sanchez, he was unable to
attract the Latina/o vote that came out in support of Sanchez.277
Latinas/os in Texas supported one of their own, Tony Sanchez,
but were not willing to engage in coalitional politics with African
American voters, perhaps because Democrats and Kirk support-
ers failed to do the grassroots work that makes coalitions
happen.278
Murray, a political science professor at the University of Houston, stating that the
Republican attack ads “polarized older Anglos and Republicans against Democrats.
. . . There was very little ticket-splitting, and there weren’t any independents at the
polls.”).
272 Schneider, supra  note 62.
273 Koenig, supra  note 265 (quoting Bob Stein, a Rice University political science
professor, stating “a Sanchez-controlled savings and loan that failed in 1988 . . .
required a $161 million federal bailout.”).
274 Id .
275 Id.
276 See MANZA & BROOKS, supra  note 264, at 157 (discussing that Whites’ politi-
cal behavior can be manipulated by subtle racial cuing); DAVID C. ANDERSON,
CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA:  HOW THE WILLIE HORTON STORY
CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995); JEREMY D. MAYER, RUNNING ON RACE:  RA-
CIAL POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, 1960-2000 (2002).
277 Koenig, supra  note 265.
278 Cf.  James A. Regalado, The Political Incorporation of L.A.’s Communities of
Color:  A Critical Assessment, in PURSUING POWER, supra  note 78, at 169-85, 185.
(“The real work to empower communities of color and build coalitions . . . has been
taking place at . . . grassroots levels. . . .”).
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b. Villaraigosa’s 2000 Bid to Become Los Angeles’ Mayor
Kevin Johnson, in his Symposium contribution, describes the
failure of Antonio Villaraigosa’s historic run for mayor of Los
Angeles in 2000.279  As described by Kevin Johnson, a key factor
in Villaraigosa’s defeat were race-baiting ads run by his Republi-
can opponent, James Hahn, which featured the image of a crack
cocaine pipe, and the following narrative:  “Fact:  The father of a
convicted crack cocaine dealer contributed money to Antonio
Villaraigosa.  Fact:  Villaraigosa wrote the White House pardon
office claiming [the man] was wrongly convicted.”280
The suggestion of complicity with drug dealers machinating a
Clinton pardon raised the drug dealing stereotype.  In Vil-
laraigosa’s case, it stuck.
Villaraigosa was also the target of a campaign by conservative
individuals and groups that denounced his “racist, anti-Ameri-
can” past,281 that is, his association with nationalist Chicano stu-
dent groups like Aztlan and MECHA.  The anti-Villaraigosa
websites featured pictures of Villaraigosa holding Mexican flags
and marching in demonstrations.282  A recorded telephone mes-
sage targeting San Fernando Valley voters denounced Vil-
laraigosa for “shocking un-American” activities.283
A minority candidate running in a racially polarized environ-
ment cannot win.  White voters overwhelmingly went for Hahn.
More importantly, as Johnson points out, the interracial coalition
failed, as eighty percent of the African American vote opted for
Hahn.284  Coalitional alliances among white liberals, Latinas/os
279 Johnson, supra  note 4, at 934.
280 Schneider, supra  note 62; see also  Gregory Rodriguez, Latino Pols Face a
Double Standard; When Did You Last Hear of a Case of ‘White Sleaze ,’ L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2002, at M1.
281 See  website at  http://www.mayorno.com/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2002).
282 See id. ; website at  http://www.americanpatrol.com/FEATURES/010406
LABORTAKEOVER/FeatureTakeoverLA010406.html.
283 The claim made by the Hal Netkin website is that the following message was
heard by over 40,000 over 1 1/2 months before the mayoral vote:
Before voting for mayor of Los Angeles, please learn the truth about can-
didate Antonio Villaraigosa, and his ties with racist organizations and
shocking un-American activities.  Mr. Villaraigosa now claims to be a
Democrat, but our website www.mayorno.com has DOCUMENTED evi-
dence that he was affiliated with radical anti-American groups with anti-
Semitic and racist overtones.  PLEASE check out the evidence for yourself
at mayorno.com and make your own decision, or call 818-989-2348.
available at  http://www.mayorno.com/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2002).
284 Johnson, supra  note 4.
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and African Americans failed to materialize;285 instead, cleav-
ages among these communities with common interests were
exposed.
D. Minority Vote Turnout and Two Party Doldrums
In the Miner’s Canary , Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres write:
[V]oting is . . . a meaningless ritual when it is not tied to power
in any substantial way, when it simply signifies assent to
choices others have engineered or arranged.  Even assuming
voting’s efficacy as a means to civic engagement, it is rendered
empty by voters’ inability to have a voice in how their votes
are allocated, or by any assurance that their vote will make a
difference. Hollow promises that “every vote counts,” incanta-
tions of “count every vote,” and stories of extraordinary elec-
tions decided by a handful of votes merely function as
exceptions that prove the rule in the face of overwhelming and
lopsided reelection rates of state and local legislatures.286
In the close Senate contests in Missouri and Georgia, weak Af-
rican American support meant a sweep by Republicans of the
two Senate seats up for grabs, McClellan and Carnahan.  The dis-
affection and the high turnout by increasingly staunchly Republi-
can white males caused a complete turnover of the control of the
Missouri and Georgia state legislature to Republicans, and a loss
by Roy Barnes in his bid for reelection in the governor’s race in
Georgia.287  In California, according to Los Angeles Times  exit
polls, Latinas/os share of the vote dropped to ten percent, the
lowest since the early 1990s.288  Meanwhile, the white share of
the California vote went up, from sixty-four percent to seventy-
six percent.289  As a consequence, the margin of Governor Grey
Davis’ victory was much closer than expected.
Democrats have only themselves to blame.  Governor Roy
Barnes, who boasted of his bonds to the African American com-
285 There has been much scholarly work on the up-to-now successful coalitional
politics in Los Angeles. See , e.g. , Regalado, supra  note 278.  As James Regalado
emphasizes, those who talk about coalitions may be only optimistic and do not suffi-
ciently focus on grassroots, community level, and non-electoral efforts. Id.  at 185.
286 GUINIER & TORRES, supra  note 19.
287 The turnout in rural white counties in Missouri and Georgia was greater than
expected. See  Murphy, supra  note 29; Jim Galloway, Barnes Says He’s Done with
Politics , ATL. J.-CONST., Nov. 13, 2002, at A1; Will Lester, GOP Seeks to Build on
Voter Turnout , Ass’d Press, Dec. 6, 2002.
288 Exit Poll California General Election, L.A. TIMES Poll, Nov. 5, 2002, available
at  http://www.images.latimes.com/media/acrobat/2002-03/6236873.pdf (last visited
July 1, 2003).
289 Id .
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munity may have failed to sufficiently motivate his supporters to
go vote.290  According to recent surveys, African American vot-
ers turned out in the election at prior levels, but failed to detect
major differences between the two parties’ policy positions.291  In
Maryland, gubernatorial candidate Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
did not tether her reelection to attractive minority candidates,
but instead attacked her Republican opponent for choosing an
African American running partner as lieutenant governor.292  In
Missouri, Senator Jean Carnahan, who won in 2000 by a slim
margin thanks to the African American vote in St. Louis, por-
trayed herself to voters in White suburban middle-class terms, as
someone who engineered the merger of a big corporation in St.
Louis, deeply cared about Social Security for elders, and voted
for the Bush tax cuts.  Her ads were predominantly staffed by
Whites from her home town, Rolla, who spoke of her rural Mis-
souri values.  Is it any wonder that these white candidates failed
to energize black voters?
In California, Governor Gray Davis vetoed an important civil
rights bill that would have given undocumented workers greater
access to drivers licenses only weeks prior to the election.  La-
tina/o state legislators had worked hard with Davis to craft a bill,
but at the last moment, Davis vetoed it justifying his action on
homeland security grounds.293  Latina/o state legislators ques-
tioned Davis’ support of the Latina/o community.294  Neverthe-
less, during the last weeks Davis campaigned hard among Latina/
o and APIA voters, attempting to reassure them that his veto
was genuine due to his concern for security issues and did not
290 Governor Barnes and others ascribed his loss to high while conservative turn-
out spurred by his opponent making an issue of whether the Confederate flag should
continue to be part of the symbolism of state governance. See  Galloway supra  note
287.
291 Melanie Eversley, Black Voter Turnout Up, Activists Say , ATL. J.-CONST., Nov.
14, 2002, at C8 (reporting 40% African American voter turnout in November 2002,
only down slightly from 2000); Alvin Williams, Is Lack of Message Costing Demo-
crats Black Vote? , THE RECORD (Bergen, N.J.), Jan. 2, 2003, at L8 (reporting Bar-
bara Arnwine, director of the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, stating
“African-Americans couldn’t figure out what the Democratic candidates stood
for”).
292 Williams, supra  note 291 (reporting the “tactic that backfired” when Townsend
unleased negative ads focusing on her opponent’s selection of Michael Steele, a
black Republican, as lieutenant governor).
293 John Marelius, Davis Trying to Win Back Disillusioned Latino Legislatures:
Competition From Green Party Seen , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 18, 2002, at A4.
294 Around October 2002 the State Latino Caucus sent Davis a letter informing
him that the Latino Caucus would not support his bid for re-election. Id.
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undermine his support of the community.295  Latina/o voters, he
pleaded, should consider his overall record.296  The minority vote
in California was crucial to Davis’ reelection.297  But minority
voters remained skeptical, and his support was noticeably less en-
thusiastic than four years ago.298  Exit polls showed that APIA
voters supported Davis, but remained wary of his future stance
on immigration issues.299  Latina/o voters, like African American
voters, are currently giving Davis overwhelming negative job
ratings.300
The game of trying to appeal to the middle is fraught with dan-
ger.  The cost to both parties, but particularly to Democrats, of
continuing to play electoral politics as if it were a “White middle-
class only” game301 is that voter turnout becomes the equivalent
of a huge snore, and voters become confused as to which party
has their interests at heart.
E. Moving Beyond the Black-White Paradigm
As discussed in Parts III.A through III.D, the post-2000 elec-
tions raise a catalog of issues on what it might mean to move
beyond the Black-White paradigm in the context of electoral
process and minority representation.
1. (Minority) Representational Theory
Law scholars talk about the political and legislative process us-
ing three principal models, deliberative or Madisonian process
theory, public choice theory, and institutionalism.302  Theoretical
295 Id.
296 Gray Davis pointed to his support for California’s DREAM Act, which allows
children of undocumented workers to pay instate tuition, and his appointment of
Latino Carlos Moreno to the California Supreme Court. Id.
297 According to L.A. Times  exit polls, among white voters, Davis lost to Simon
43% to 46%.  Davis was able to retain a substantial lead among Latino/a voters
(65% to 24%), APIA voters (making up 6% of all California voters) (54% to 37%),
and African Americans (making up 4% of all California voters) (79% to 10%).
L.A. TIMES Poll, supra  note 288.
298 Schneider, supra  note 62 (quoting L.A. TIMES estimates that 350,000 fewer
Hispanics voted for Davis in 2000 than four years ago).
299 See  discussion supra  note 297 and accompanying text.
300 Michael Finnegan, The Times Poll; Davis’ Job Rating Falls to All-Time Low of
27% , L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1 (based on telephone poll of 1300 voters).
301 For criticism of the two party duopoly from a racial perspective, see Fuentes-
Rohwer, supra  note 19, at 353-55; Smith, Black Party , supra  note 19.
302 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUB-
LIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001).
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work within LatCrit scholarship should focus on how each of
these models explains (or do not) the underrepresentation of mi-
nority voices in the political system.  This critical theory work has
already begun303 but because politics and the legal process are
ever-changing, continuing critical inquiry is needed to further re-
fine seminal work.  In addition, empirical work by political scien-
tists has brought out challenging paradoxes.  Joining theory,
empirical investigation and doctrinal critique should inform civil
rights efforts.  For example, issues that litigants must answer
under Voting Rights Act claims, such as what might constitute a
vote dilution claim and what it means for a minority group to
have “meaningful representation,” can be informed by the criti-
cal work done in representational theory and the insights that
political scientists have drawn from their empirical work.
Another area of inquiry that moves the conversation beyond
the Black-and-White closed circle is signaled by the sobering
questions raised in the Symposium contributions.  First, Kevin
Johnson asks whether it is necessary to have more elected minor-
ity representatives in order for racial minorities to achieve
“meaningful representation.”304  Second, Johnson, Feng, Aoki,
and Ikegami trenchantly raise the specter that minority repre-
sentatives might become another “cog” in the political machinery
of entrenched incumbents who are consumed by self-interest and
further political agendas that benefit only insiders.305  Political
scientists have raised other tough issues.  Professor Lublin finds
that the process of drawing district lines to assure greater minor-
ity representation, also undermines the likelihood of substantive
policies that favor minority communities will be enacted.306
Other works predict that a Latina/o and APIAs discriptive repre-
sentation will continue to be minimal because, at this point, there
are not many more potential majority-minority districts that can
be carved out.307  Hero and Tolbert find that Latina/o influence
303 See  sources cited supra  note 19.
304 See  Johnson, supra  note 4, at 8.
305 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 897; Johnson, supra  note 4, at 926.
306 See LUBLIN, supra  note 112.
307 Hero, supra  note 88, at 89-92 (finding that the percent of Latinas/os in a non-
Latina/o Representatives’ district had no impact on Representative voting on bills
that pertained to Latino substantive policies in the 1988 Congress); Hero & Tolbert,
supra  note 106, at 272-73 (using data on the 100th Congress and concluding that
with respect to individual bills Latinas/os continued to have virtually no influence on
Representatives, but that collectively, U.S. Congress may have substantively repre-
sented Latina/o policies).
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on non-Latina/o elected U.S. Representatives was virtually non-
existent, however, on key issues important to the Latina/o com-
munity, such interests were well represented by a Democratically
controlled Congress.308  These questions and paradoxes raise is-
sues of identity, agency, and authenticity, which have been at the
center of critical race and LaCrit theory inquiry.309  The intersec-
tion of identity theory and political process/representative theory
promises insights useful to the kinds of question that courts, like
in Cano v. Davis , are currently raising in Voting Rights Act
litigation.310
Finally, both Symposium contributions raise a broader ques-
tion, just how much does the minority vote matter if it is a “swing
vote” for major party candidates, who as Professor Lanier notes,
may be “unaware of [minority voters] decisive impact or deliber-
ately ignore it because of even more decisive white support.”311
Moreover, just how relevant can the Latina/o and APIA vote be
in a two-party system that favors incumbents and neutralizes
newcomers?  These questions seem to be at odds with the civil
rights activism of informing elected officials and the public that
minority voters are  playing a deciding role in elections.  How
does “swing voter” influence translate into progressive politics?
These are difficult questions, but they should be answered since
they bring into sharp focus the tension in critical inquiry and civil
rights aspirations.
2. The Politics of Redistricting
a. Incumbency Protection Plans?
Prior to the elections, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus
Chairman, Rep. Silvestre Reyes, believed that there was a possi-
bility of increasing the Latina/o representation by “about six to
10 possibilities.”312 The actual net gain, post-2000 redistricting,
was four.  Larry Gonzalez, Washington director of NALEO,
308 See  Maurilio E. Vigil, Hispanics in the 103rd Congress:  The 1990 Census, Re-
apportionment, Redistricting, and the 1992 Elections in PURSUING POWER, supra
note 78, at 234-64; Harry P. Pachon, Hispanic Underrepresentation in the Federal
Bureaucracy:  The Missing Link in the Policy Process , in LATINOS AND THE POLITI-
CAL SYSTEM, supra  note 78, at 306-27.
309 See , e.g. , [Symposium contributions]; George A. Martinez, Philosophical Con-
siderations and the Use of Narrative in Law  30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 692 (1999).
310 See  discussion supra  notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
311 GUINIER, supra  note 19, at 89.
312 House, supra  note 232.
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summed up this disappointing result by describing states’ redis-
tricting as “incumbent protection plans.”313  Incumbency,314 in
combination with campaign financing315 and a two-party political
system,316 are major structural factors that militate against major
changes in the satus quo.  Moving beyond “Black and White”
politics means exploring these structural issues of entrenchment,
as well as focusing on possible coalitions with the grassroots in-
terests that oppose entrenchment politics and a decade ago
passed term-limit initiatives in many states.
b. The Hard Work of Coalition Politics
Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami have made a significant contribution
to understanding the law and politics of redistricting with their
Symposium article.  There are valuable lessons to be drawn for
political activism that goes beyond Black and White politics.
First, CAPAFR organized early and was focused on its objec-
tives.317  Although not lavishly funded, they expended resources
to engage in high-level conversations necessary to represent the
interests of APIA voters in California.318  They were well-pre-
pared with the requisite statistical studies and political experts.319
Second, coalitional politics was not taken for granted.  Frequent
meetings, working together in fashioning agendas, and acquiring
skills in groups were trust-building tools necessary for CAPAFR,
MALDEF, and other groups to work together.320  Third,
CAPAFR worked closely with elected APIA officials.  This con-
trasts sharply with the public riff between MALDEF and state
Representatives Martha Escutia and Gloria Romero.321  In con-
trast, CAPAFR built a solid relationship with state Representa-
tives Judy Chu and George Nakano,322 which should pay off in
the future.
Moving beyond Black and White politics involves understand-
ing that coalitional politics is not theoretical, but involves hard
work, trust building, and careful nursing of individual relation-
313 Id .
314 See supra  notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
315 See supra  notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
316 See supra  notes 27-28 and accompanying text and discussion at Part IV.D.




321 See  discussion supra  notes 251 and accompanying text.
322 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3 at 48.
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ships.  The words of Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres are helpful:
“the hard work of democracy is really found in mobilizing, and
engaging participation of ordinary people at the grassroots
level.”323
c. Campaigning in Racially Polarized Environments
The most sobering lesson of post-2000 elections was how effec-
tive media campaigns in “Horton-izing”324 competitive minority
candidates, Arturo Villaraigosa and Tony Sanchez were.  Sergio
Bendixen, a political consultant, maintains that Republicans have
found an effective way to run against competitive Latina/o candi-
dates, “[w]hen a Latino gets close to being able to win a contest
in a state or a district or a city where the majority of voters is not
Hispanic, the common attack now is drugs. . . . That’s a sure way
to destroy their candidacy.”325  The 2002 elections reaffirm ear-
lier work by political scientists that where a minority candidate’s
race becomes salient by subtle racial cueing, the candidate will
lose.326  The practice remains widely used, as 2002 shows, even as
those who profit deny that their ads are racial.
LatCrit research has already stepped beyond the Black-White
paradigm by documenting the effectiveness of race-baiting media
campaigns in the context of Proposition 187.327  Post-2000 elec-
tions suggest that inquiry into this area should continue to be
documented and studied.  More specifically, racial stereotypes
stuck to Arturo Villaraigosa and Tony Sanchez,328 but did not
stick in Susan Castillo’s race.329  Arturo Villaraigosa has been an
immigrant rights activist, Chicano youth leader, and unionist.
The lesson of the 2002 elections is that a Latina/o candidate with
a strong civil rights activist background is “dead meat” if he or
she decides to run for office.  By contrast, Susan Castillo’s profile
323 GUINIER & TORRES, supra  note 19. See also  Regalado, supra  note 278.
324 The phrase refers to the Willie Horton ads that President George H.W. Bush
used during his presidential race against Mike Dukakis. See generally MAYER,
supra  note 276; ANDERSON, supra  note 276.
325 Schneider, supra  note 62.
326 Smith, Race and Money in Politics , supra  note 19, at 1486-88.
327 See  Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism:  Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, Something Blue , in IMMIGRANTS OUT!:  THE NEW NATIVISM
AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (Juan F. Perea ed.,
1997); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy,
and California’s Proposition 187:  The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of
Race , 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 650–61 (1995).
328 See supra  Part IV.C.2.a.
329 See supra  Part IV.C.1.b.
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as a Latina professional in a White dominated TV media came
through as “White,” even when nasty commentators tried to
racialize her campaign.  This suggests that LatCrit should de-
velop a race theoretic explanation based on social science as to
why racial baiting works in some cases and not in others.
Second, reformist scholars should pursue a project that singles
out race-baiting ads for regulation.  Professors Smith and Over-
ton330 have drawn a stark picture of the many obstacles that mi-
nority candidacies must overcome.  Free speech regulation is
unpopular in mainstream academia; the case should be made for
regulation of racially of racially cued ads331 since campaign race-
baiting has proven so effective in squashing minority candidacies.
d. Voter Turnout Doldrums
Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami maintain that APIAs and Latinas/os
must “flex their political muscle . . . by showing up in significant
numbers at the polls.”332  But this may be a naı¨ve take on minor-
ity voter turnout, one that unnecessarily boxes the Latina/o and
APIA electorate into a “no win” proposition.  Lose if you turn
out (because the choices are so unappealing) and lose if you do
not turn out (because promises of the potential voting power of
APIAs and Latinas/os did not pan out).
In California, Latinas/os and APIAs were disappointed with
Gray Davis and did not go to the booths in the numbers that they
had before.333  Gray Davis “dissed” the Latina/o and APIA elec-
torate,334 and he was rewarded in kind.  In Massachusetts, La-
tinas/os turned out to vote in record numbers because a clone of
Proposition 227 was on the ballot.335  The initiative that Latinas/
os overwhelming opposed won, but breakthroughs were made in
electing Latina/o state representatives.336  Latinas/os and APIAs
seem to have a great deal of innate common sense regarding
when to go vote and when not to bother.  Perhaps LatCrit theory
should take on the task of explaining the innate good sense of
330 Smith, Race and Money in Politics , supra  note 19; Overton, supra  note 19.
331 Cf.  Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising:  The Clash Be-
tween the First Amendment and Defamation Law , 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
667 (1998) (arguing for regulatory scheme of political guidelines).
332 See  Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 901.
333 See supra  notes 296-98.
334 See  discussion supra  note 264 and accompanying text.
335 See  discussion supra  notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
336 See  discussion supra  note 230 and accompanying text.
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Latinas/os and APIAs, rather than repeat mainstream judgments
that disembody and remove agency from ordinary people.
IV
THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH:  INITIATIVES IN WHICH THE
CONTENT OF MINORITIES’ CIVIL RIGHTS ARE
VOTED ON BY THE MAJORITY
In introducing the LatCrit voting rights panel, Professor Keith
Aoki linked initiatives and referenda within a race theoretic vi-
sion of political process.337  Historically, initiatives and referenda
have been an important law-making mechanism that has de-
creased the content of, or staved off advances, in minority rights.
When initiatives and referenda that address the content of civil
rights of minorities are voted on by majorities, minorities lose
over eighty percent of the time.338  Why such a dismal record?
Derrick Bell famously noted that initiatives “reflect[ ] all too ac-
curately the conservative, even intolerant, attitudes citizens dis-
play when given the chance to vote their fears and prejudices
. . . .”339  My own work has argued that the dynamics are more
complex.  Undeniably, initiatives put in play majority-minority
dominant group dynamics, racial feelings, but also involve legiti-
mate differences over cultural symbolism and group identity.340
A race centered discussion of political and electoral process can-
not be complete without discussing this significant form of de-
mocracy and law-making.
A. 2002 Language Initiatives
In the November 2002 elections, Colorado and Massachusetts
voters had an opportunity to vote on whether these states would
continue bilingual education, or adopt the one-year English im-
mersion plan championed by Silicon Valley millionaire Ronald
Unz known in California as Proposition 227.341  After his Califor-
nia success, Mr. Unz funded a foundation that has put a version
of Proposition 227, known as “English for the Children,” on the
ballots in Arizona, Massachusetts, and Colorado.342  In 2002, vot-
337 See  LatCrit VII, supra  note 2.
338 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 431.
339 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:  Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality ,
54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1978).
340 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 431.
341 See id . at 410, 420.
342 Anand Vaishnav, English Immersion Plan Wins Over Bilingual Ed , BOSTON
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ers in Massachusetts enacted the initiative, while voters in Colo-
rado defeated it.
The Colorado defeat is historic because it is the first time that
a language anti-minority initiative has been defeated at a state-
wide level.  The key difference was that in Colorado the anti-
proposition forces were aided by millionaire heiress, Pat Stryker,
who supported the “English Plus” anti-initiative campaign with
$3 million dollars.343  These funds financed campaign ads that ar-
gued that the Unz one-year English immersion plan would cost
Colorado school districts tens of millions of dollars to imple-
ment.344  Colorado voters turned down the measure by a two-to-
one vote, the proportion by which anti-minority language initia-
tives usually win.345
In Massachusetts, by contrast, the one-year immersion plan
won by seventy percent of the vote.346  The Latina/o community
in Massachusetts turned out in record numbers; ninety two per-
cent opposed the initiative.347  However, the Massachusetts expe-
rience followed the typical pattern of language initiatives.  The
non-Latino, English speaking majority overpowered a cultural
and language minority, even though the minority saw the initia-
tive as substantially undermining their civil rights and standing
within the civic community.
B. Moving Beyond the Black-White Paradigm
A traditional civil rights reaction to initiatives that undermine
minority civil rights is litigation.  In the 1960s, successful litiga-
tion successfully neutralized anti-integration initiatives.348  One
might argue that 1960s courts were more friendly to minorities’
civil rights than post-2000 courts.  However, the counterargu-
ment is that civil rights litigation has always relied on it being a
long-run educative process.
Initiatives are harmful, not because minorities lose (they will
GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2002, at A1; Eric Hubler, Amendment 31 Bilingual-Ed Ban Fails;
Wartgrow Hails Defeat , DENVER POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at E2.
343 Hubler, supra  note 342.
344 Id .
345 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 430-47.
346 Vaishnav, supra  note 342.
347 Rodriguez, supra  note 94 (reporting a turnout increase by forty-one percent
from the 1998 midterm election).
348 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 542-43.
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lose because of sheer mathematics).349  Anti-minority initiatives
are harmful because they undermine the content of minorities’
citizenship in the political and civic community and undermine
their ability to participate in the to-and-fro of democratic civic
life.  It is this vigorous exchange that allows majorities and mi-
norities to fashion norms and conditions of co-existence.350  I
have argued elsewhere that the Equal Protection Clause should
be understood as embodying this main guiding principle.351  For
example, in the case of language initiatives, a majority vote reaf-
firming the primacy or exclusivity of English rejects multi-lin-
gual/cultural communities by “telling” them that there is no place
within the public community for their culture or language.352 The
rejection of a minority’s language and culture is seen by that
group as a rejection of its place in that civic and political commu-
nity.  This kind of alienation harms the community as a whole
and makes peaceful co-existence more difficult.
Moving beyond the Back-White paradigm in this context
means adopting a civil rights litigation strategy where the case
can be made that it is appropriate that courts intervene where a
court finds that majorities are undermining the ability of minor-
ity groups to participate in the polity.353  Courts’ appropriate
function is to preserve a political process where majorities and
minorities can co-exist.354  This does not mean that courts should
always strike down initiatives where minority groups feel
strongly and lose to the vote of a majority.  Rather, the constitu-
tional norm of Equal Protection dictates heightened court scru-
tiny and intervention in cases where the court has found that a
minority’s civic standing and ability to participate in the political
process have been severely impinged.355
349 Id.  at 444-45.
350 Id.  at 509-13.
351 See  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion:  Reconceptualizing the
Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity , 58 MD. L. REV. 150 (1999) [hereinafter Lazos
Vargas, Democracy & Inclusion].
352 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 445 (“[L]anguage is a
symbol of heritage and identity. . . . For Latinos, even those who lose their ability to
speak Spanish . . . [the] language . . . is related with affective attitudes of self-identity
and self-worth.”).
353 Id . at 516-26.
354 Id . at 511. See also  Lazos Vargas, Democracy & Inclusion , supra  note 351, at
160-83.
355 Lazos Vargas, Initiatives & Minorities , supra  note 5, at 517-27.  The test that I
have proposed is based on my reading of Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  A
court should apply heightened review where the court has found that ability to par-
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A LatCrit perspective that moves beyond the Black-White
paradigm would fully explore the complexity of intergroup con-
flict that develops in the context of anti-minority initiatives.  Not
every successful anti-minority initiative is primarily motivated by
racial animus; however, it is true that racial resentment and racial
hostility do almost always play some role.  Racial feelings are
most likely to be salient where a media campaign has stirred up
stereotypes and triggered the majority’s anxiety over changes in a
status quo where their view dominated.356  Many initiatives also
involve ideological disagreements.  In the case of language initia-
tives, the ideological disagreement is over whether culturally dif-
ferent minorities should be able to preserve their own language
or assimilate quickly, that is, the English-only, or one-language,
proponents believe that to be an American requires a monol-
ingual English speaking culture.  Moving beyond the Black-
White paradigm involves exploring the full complexity of senti-
ments that are involved, and then trying to frame these differ-
ences in a way that achieves a better understanding of racial,
social, and ideological dynamics, but does not shy away from
where and how racial animus animates the divisions within our
political communities.
CONCLUSION
Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki, and Bryan Ikegami’s essay sounds
as a glass half-full, while Kevin Johnson’s contribution sounds as
a glass half-empty.  Both are right.  There is reason to be optimis-
tic and pessimistic.  Minorities are fighting a political structure of
representation that resists change.  They are confronted with
paradoxes as to how best to promote their interests within a rep-
resentative structure that favors the political status quo.  Federal
courts have promised “meaningful representation” but have
been reluctant to enforce remedies.  Coalition work is slow, diffi-
cult, and full of pitfalls.
A post-Civil Rights and LatCrit project must engage the un-
pleasant.  Minorities with a distinct cultural ethos, political view-
point, and socio-economic reality have been unable to have a
ticipate in the political process becomes “more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others,” id.  at 633; the initiative singles out and stigmatizes an unpopular
minority group, without any legitimate justification, id.  at 635; and finally, exclusion
from civil and political society occurs because of a disfavored group’s status, id.  at
631.
356 Id . at 462-74.
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meaningful voice in a two-party, winner-takes-all, political sys-
tem that protects incumbents, freezes in the duopolistic power of
an ossified two-party system, and over relies on money as speech.
Does the avenue to meaningful minority empowerment lie in
playing the merchant minority game, persuading the White polit-
ical bosses that they should court minority voters, as swing vot-
ers, in specific elections?  There is a role for this kind of
negotiation, but the accompanying baggage is model minority
rhetoric.  This game must be carefully played.
Ultimately the problems of the minority community are con-
ceptual and structural.  The far reaching solutions proposed by
Professor Lani Guinier in 1986 in her path-breaking work were
viewed as so radical that her seminal work cost her the position
of Attorney General in the Clinton White House.  (We got Janet
Reno instead for eight years).  LatCrit provides an intellectual
home base to form new far-reaching proposals that challenge
mainstream academics and political pundits to rethink the very
basic concepts of who votes, how they vote, and why they vote.
These are long-term projects that LatCrit adherents must take
on in order that the theoretical anti-subordination “talk” lines up
with the LatCrit activist “walk.”  But as Feng, Aoki, and Ikegami
warmly note, “the process of gaining political influence is a long
one, fraught with setbacks and disappointments but not without
concomitant successful moments.”357
357 See Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra  note 3, at 903.
